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ABSTRACT 
Research indicates that the benefits of regionalization include optimal resource 
allocation and enhanced communication across jurisdictions. In this thesis, 
regionalization is defined as the act of the region collaboratively working across 
jurisdictional boundaries in a formal capacity to network, preplan and respond 
during incidents. 
The 2009 Kentucky ice storm devastated the entire state. Some counties 
throughout the commonwealth collaborated during the response; however, only 
one region out of eleven formally regionalized. Possible factors related to 
regionalization will be explored, such as support and understanding by leaders of 
the concept and the importance of networking with a variety of agencies. 
Networking is described as interorganizational interaction and communication. 
Tools from social network analysis are used to visualize networking and 
collaboration during the 2009 Kentucky ice storm. In addition, regionalization is 
discussed in the context of area command.  
Using a case study and interviews, this thesis investigates regionalization 
in Kentucky as it relates to the 2009 ice storm. Recommendations are presented 
for improving responses to future large-scale disasters utilizing regionalization.  
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A. PROBLEM ............................................................................................... 1 
1. Defining Regionalization......................................................... 1 
2. County Governments and Emergency Management............ 2 
3. Kentucky Emergency Management ....................................... 3 
4. Current Protocol for Disaster Response in Kentucky .......... 4 
5. Problems .................................................................................. 4 
6. Area Command Versus Regionalization................................ 5 
7. Leadership and Regionalization............................................. 6 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS....................................................................... 8 
C. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................ 8 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH .......................................................... 11 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................ 13 
A. REGIONALIZATION.............................................................................. 13 
B. DEFINING AND CHARACTERIZING REGIONALIZATION.................. 14 
1. Geographical Boundaries ..................................................... 14 
2. Stakeholders .......................................................................... 15 
C. BENEFITS AND OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY 
REGIONALIZATION .......................................................................... 15 
D. CHALLENGES OF REGIONALIZATION .............................................. 16 
E. ESTABLISHED REGIONS IN KENTUCKY........................................... 17 
1. Area Development Districts .................................................. 17 
2. Kentucky Emergency Management Regions ...................... 18 
3. Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) ............................... 18 
4. Health Departments............................................................... 19 
5. American Red Cross ............................................................. 20 
F. THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN REGIONALIZATION ........................ 20 
1. Adaptive Leadership ............................................................. 20 
2. Meta-Leadership .................................................................... 21 
3. Collaborative Leadership...................................................... 21 
G. LEADERSHIP, REGIONALIZATION, AND NETWORKS ..................... 22 
H. THE KENTUCKY 2009 ICE STORM CASE STUDY ............................. 23 
I. GAPS IN REGIONALIZATION AND LEADERSHIP LITERATURE...... 30 
III. METHODOLOGY.......................................................................................... 31 
A. SAMPLE................................................................................................ 32 
B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS..................................................................... 33 
C. DATA COLLECTION............................................................................. 35 
D. DATA ANALYSIS.................................................................................. 35 
E. CONCLUSION OF METHODOLOGY CHAPTER ................................. 36 
IV. ANALYSIS OF HEALTH DEPARTMENT AFTER-ACTION REPORTS....... 37 
 viii
A. ANALYSIS OF HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM, 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, AND AREA DEVELOPMENT 
DISTRICT REGIONS ......................................................................... 37 
B. REGIONALIZATION.............................................................................. 42 
C. HEALTH DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES WITH THE MOST 
CONNECTIONS................................................................................. 47 
D. SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 50 
V. FINDINGS..................................................................................................... 53 
A. IDENTIFIED RESPONSE SUCCESSES ............................................... 53 
B. IDENTIFIED RESPONSE FAILURES ................................................... 54 
1. Communication...................................................................... 55 
2. Resource Ordering, Mobilizing, Receiving, 
Reimbursement...................................................................... 55 
3. The State EOC Was Overrun................................................. 57 
4. Lack of Planning for Special Medical Needs Shelters and 
Pet Shelters ............................................................................ 59 
5. Regional Hospital Preparedness Program Trailers ............ 60 
6. Issues With Regional Emergency Management.................. 61 
C. PREVIOUS PLANNING WITH PARTNER AGENCIES......................... 61 
D. REGIONALIZATION.............................................................................. 63 
E. WHY REGIONALIZATION DID NOT OCCUR....................................... 64 
1. Inability to Communicate ...................................................... 65 
2. Counties Were Overwhelmed ............................................... 65 
3. Political Barriers .................................................................... 65 
4. Lack of Training ..................................................................... 66 
5. Lack of Emergency Management Area Managers .............. 66 
F. HOW REGIONALIZATION MIGHT HAVE IMPACTED THE 
RESPONSE ....................................................................................... 66 
G. LEADERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF REGIONALIZATION .......................... 67 
H. PROMOTING REGIONALIZATION....................................................... 69 
I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS .................................................................... 69 
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................... 71 
A. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY............................................................. 71 
B. OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONALIZATION, PAST, PRESENT, 
AND FUTURE .................................................................................... 72 
C. REGIONALIZATION VERSUS AREA COMMAND............................... 73 
D. BENEFITS TO COUNTIES AND THE STATE EOC.............................. 74 
1. County Benefits ..................................................................... 74 
2. State EOC Benefits ................................................................ 75 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGIONALZATION................................ 76 
1. What Agency Should Implement Regionalization? ............ 76 
2. Full-Time Local Emergency Management Directors........... 78 
3. Chain of Command for Resource Requests........................ 79 
4. Area Commands Must Be Adequately Staffed .................... 79 
5. Education, Plans, and Exercises.......................................... 81 
 ix
6. Emergency Management and Networking........................... 82 
7. Framework for Regionalization ............................................ 83 
F. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH.......................................... 84 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 85 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................................................. 93 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Ice Accumulations Across Kentucky During the 2009 Ice Storm 
(Source: National Weather Service, 2009a) ....................................... 25 
Figure 2. Kentucky Emergency Management Regions Represented in After-
action Reports (Source: 
http://www.kyem.ky.gov/about/regionalresponseoffices.htm) ............. 39 
Figure 3. Kentucky Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) Regions 
Represented in After-action Reports .................................................. 40 
Figure 4. Kentucky Area Development District (ADD) Regions Represented 
in After-action Reports (Source: 
http://www.kcadd.org/District_Contacts.html) ..................................... 40 
Figure 5. Ice Accumulations Across Kentucky During the 2009 Ice Storm 
(Source: National Weather Service, 2009a) ....................................... 41 
Figure 6. Network Visualization of Health Departments’ AARs.......................... 48 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Health Departments That Submitted After-Action Reports ................. 32 
Table 2. Interview Participants ......................................................................... 33 
Table 3. Regions Represented by Health Departments that Submitted After-
Action Reports.................................................................................... 38 
Table 4. Ice Accumulation and Health Departments ........................................ 42 
Table 5. Partners Listed in Provided Health Department After-Action Reports 44 
Table 6. Total Number of Agencies Health Departments Coordinated With 
Based on After-Action Reports ........................................................... 45 
Table 7. Total Agencies Mentioned in After-Action Reports ............................. 46 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAR   After-Action Report 
CRI   Cities Readiness Initiative 
EMAC  Emergency Management Assistance Compact  
EMS  Emergency Medical Service  
EOC   Emergency Operation Center 
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency  
HPP  Hospital Preparedness Program  
KRS   Kentucky Revised Statute 
KYEM  Kentucky Emergency Management 
MMRS Metropolitan Medical Response System  
MRC   Medical Reserve Corps  
NIMS  National Incident Management System 
 xvi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xvii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
To the Center for Homeland Defense and Security, thank you for believing 
in me and granting me the tremendous opportunity to be involved in the program. 
The professors were topnotch, and I could not imagine a more comprehensive 
curriculum. Lessons I have learned through the program have made me a more 
analytical public-health and homeland security professional. 
To my fellow classmates, you have been instrumental in my learning 
journey. I will sorely miss our academic and practical discussions on homeland 
security issues. I will also forever be in your debt for teaching me to love 
baseball.  
To my Mom, you are an inspiration and the strongest person I know. To 
my brother, Ben, you provided the constant encouragement that I needed. To my 
Dad, thanks for providing motivation by threatening me with bodily harm if I did 
not finish this degree. 
Richard Bergin and Lauren Wollman, you both have been wonderful thesis 
advisors. I am grateful for your recommendations and support and for pushing 
me out of the nest when I needed it. 
To the twelve leaders that agreed to be interviewed for this thesis, I am 
extremely appreciative that you shared your experience and knowledge with me. 
I hope I have done justice to your stories, successes, frustrations, and ideas. 
I am very blessed to work with an amazing network of professional 
colleagues. Thank you for your feedback and candid conversations regarding 
questions I had along the way. Without you, this thesis would have been an 
extremely lonely adventure. 
To my amazing husband, Matt, you are my foundation. Words cannot 
express the gratitude I have for the support you have provided me in life and 
throughout this program. Thank you. 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM 
Research indicates that regionalization is an effective means to improve 
relief efforts by dealing with the coordination problems endemic to disaster relief 
(United States Department of Homeland Security [USDHS], 2005; Foster, 2006; 
Heritage Foundation, 2006). However, in Kentucky, a recent statewide ice storm 
showcased the reality that regionalization was not utilized in the majority of 
responses.  
By not formally collaborating during an emergency, many potential 
problems emerge related to the use of resources, communication gaps, and 
duplicate efforts—all of these issues were noted in after-action reports to the 
response to the ice storm.  
1. Defining Regionalization 
While literature indicates that regions and regionalization are important, 
the definition of “regions” and “regionalization” many have different meanings to 
different people.  
The national preparedness guidelines define a region as “a geographic 
area consisting of contiguous Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal entities” 
(USDHS, 2005, p. 43). 
Regionalization is discussed by William Austin, in his Naval Postgraduate 
School thesis, “The United States Department of Homeland Security Concept of 
Regionalization—Will it Survive the Test?” He states, “Regionalization at some 
level provides the opportunity to use mutual aid resources and deploy response 
assets that a single municipality acting alone may not even know exist. Arguably 
it provides a more effective and efficient use of resources, but it defines the 
human nature of the local government culture” (Austin, 2006, p. 21). 
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Regionalization has many widely accepted definitions. For the purpose of 
this thesis, a definition will be established. A “region” refers to a group of counties 
throughout Kentucky that have been established by a state-level government. 
“Regionalization” will refer to the act of the region collaboratively working across 
jurisdictional boundaries in a formal capacity to network, preplan, and respond 
during incidents.  
2. County Governments and Emergency Management  
The commonwealth of Kentucky is home to approximately 4.3 million 
people and contains 120 counties, each with its own unique set of resources to 
respond to natural and man-made disasters (United States Census Bureau, 
2010). Every county has a chief elected official, the judge executive, who in turn 
appoints an emergency management director to assist in coordinating responses 
within the jurisdiction. According to Kentucky Revised Statute 39B.020, the 
county judge executive of each county shall appoint a local emergency 
management director within 30 days of obtaining office. The county judge 
executive in conjunction with the county fiscal court hires the local emergency 
management director as either a part-time or full-time employee. 
Local emergency management directors, full-time and part-time alike, are 
responsible for “developing and maintaining local emergency operation plans; 
establishing local disaster and emergency services; notifying the County Judge 
and the Division of Emergency Management of an emergency; acting as the on-
scene representative of the county during an emergency; supervising all paid or 
volunteer emergency management workers; and submitting activity reports to the 
Kentucky Emergency Area Manager” (Kentucky Revised Statute 39B.030). 
Some county emergency management directors across the state are part-
time employees, and those individuals may need to supplement their income by 
holding a full-time job. Part-time emergency management directors may not have 
time to attend preparedness planning meetings that occur during business hours. 
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 If a large-scale incident occurs, the county will set up an emergency 
operation center (EOC) to oversee the command and control of the response and 
resource allocation. If a county cannot manage the incident with the resources it 
has access to, the state EOC is notified and becomes involved, especially with 
resource allocation.  
3. Kentucky Emergency Management 
The Commonwealth’s Division of Emergency Management is a division of 
the Kentucky Department of Military Affairs, and its role and function are 
governed by legislative action dictated in Chapter 39 of the Kentucky Revised 
Statutes.  
There are 11 Kentucky emergency management area managers across 
the state, and each county is assigned to one of the 11 emergency management 
regions based on its geographical location (Kentucky Division of Emergency 
Management [KYEM], 2010a).  
Kentucky Emergency Management regional staff “has the responsibility to 
carry out the coordination of information and resources within the region and 
between the state and regional levels to ensure effective and efficient support to 
local response. The Regions serve as the conduit for local and regional 
perspective and provide a physical presence for Kentucky Emergency 
Management functions at the local levels in all phases of Emergency 
Management” (KYEM, 2010b). 
During large incidents, the KYEM area managers provide support to 
impacted counties, provide on-site coordination, and collect damage 
assessments, situation reports, and other information from their assigned 
counties to summarize and report to the state EOC. The Division of Emergency 
Management is responsible for managing the state EOC.  
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4. Current Protocol for Disaster Response in Kentucky 
The current protocol described below represents a starting point for 
addressing regionalization in the commonwealth of Kentucky. Given that 
regionalization was only enacted in one region out of 11 during the ice storm, the 
normal protocol for disaster response should be explored.  
During any event, requests for resources begin at the local level. County 
agencies and responders send requests for resources to the county EOC, where 
the county emergency manager contacts the state EOC to assist in the 
acquisition of resources. However, during a small event, the county emergency 
manager will often contact neighboring jurisdictions to request resources on a 
mutual aid basis without contacting or coordinating with the state EOC.  
Each region has a Kentucky Emergency Management (KYEM) area 
manager who facilitates the response within each county and assists in regional 
coordination. The KYEM area manager also has the option to network and to 
request assistance from within the established region if resources within a 
particular county are scarce or nonexistent during a response.  
5. Problems  
The previous discussion illustrates the relationship between the county 
and the state emergency management divisions and the interaction of the 
agencies during a response. It is one thing to understand the current chain of 
command, but an assessment of the current response protocol can only be made 
by assessing observed behavior and identifying problems in the actual response.  
A recent statewide emergency suggested that the responses involving 
multiple counties need to be examined, especially in regards to regionalization. In 
January 2009, Kentucky experienced an unprecedented ice storm that crippled 
the vast majority of the state. Out of 120 counties, 105 had declared a state of 




across the state, sheltering approximately 6,600 people (0.15% of the population) 
and more than 700,000 people (16.2% of the population) were without electricity 
(Kentucky’s ice storm worse in aftermath, 2009, KYEM, 2009v). 
Most counties activated emergency operation centers and submitted 
requests from the county to the state EOC without assessing the resources 
available within the region. This resulted in the state EOC being bombarded with 
calls and requests, making it very difficult to prioritize and fulfill requests. 
Information, questions, and requests from all 120 counties poured into one 
central location. Effectively managing massive amounts of information was nearly 
impossible for the state EOC and overwhelmed the resource management 
section. Resource requests were delayed, duplicated, or sometimes lost, 
complicating the allocation of scarce supplies of food, water, blankets, and 
generators.  
6. Area Command Versus Regionalization  
The documents of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and 
the National Response Framework (NRF) both address the concept of 
regionalization through area command. Throughout NIMS and the NRF, area 
command is defined as “an organization to oversee the management of multiple 
incidents handled individually by separate Incident Command System 
organizations” (USDHS, 2008). 
The concept of area command differs from regionalization. As discussed 
in Chapter II, area command is a framework established by the federal 
government for a large-scale or regional response. Area command does not 
address collaboration or planning in a formal capacity prior to the incident; rather, 
area command only addresses response. 
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7. Leadership and Regionalization 
The concept of regionalization is not new, and most leaders understand 
that for a successful response, collaboration and sharing must occur. In small, 
rural counties throughout Kentucky and the nation, it is understood that turning to 
a neighboring county in time of need is crucial for the mission to succeed. Since 
federal preparedness funding, such as the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) and 
the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), is not abundant throughout 
the state, Kentucky must make wise decisions about resource purchases in order 
to augment response. In a large-scale disaster, because of scarce resources, 
Kentucky relies on emergency management assistance compacts (EMACs) for 
assistance from outside states. Regionalization could be a mechanism for 
Kentucky to better utilize EMACs and FEMA resources or perhaps to rely less 
upon them.  
During the 2009 ice storm, one of the largest disasters that Kentucky has 
faced within the recent past, only one functioning formal regional structure was 
established for response efforts. The KYEM area manager in Region 1 pulled 
together the counties in her emergency management region and activated a 
Region 1 area command center. All requests, situation awareness reports, 
questions, and problems in each Area 1 county were directed to area command, 
where they were compiled and analyzed before being sent to the state EOC. 
With the exception of Area 1, no other regions or area command centers were 
established during the event.  
Just because regions exist does not mean that regionalization or 
collaboration will occur. In some cases, regions may only exist because they 
were formed by state-level agencies. Formal regionalization only occurs when a 
leader within a region recognizes the need for improved command and control 
and executes a plan or a structure for the counties within his or her region to 
collaborate through a formal mechanism. Networking and collaboration may 
occur from county to county; however, only with a formal structure can effective 
regionalization occur. 
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Just as regions do not imply regionalization, plans or structures for 
regionalization may not be implemented just because they exist. In “Translating a 
Regional Vision into Action,” the authors claim that leadership is the proverbial 
key to regionalization. They state that “leaders who are passionate about the 
visioning initiative are also important in selling the effort to participants and 
contributors” (Cartwright & Wilbur, 2005, p. 8). It is wonderful that written and 
verbal plans exist, but without a visionary leader who can also “sell” the idea of 
working together to multiple jurisdictions and stakeholders, regionalization efforts 
may not be implemented. However, even the most passionate and visionary 
leaders may not embrace regionalization if they have a negative perception of 
the concept, if they do not understand the benefits, or if there are barriers to 
regionalization. Responders and leaders alike may also be hesitant to formally 
regionalize another layer of bureaucracy at the regional level is perceived to be 
necessary for resource procurement. 
With the worst disaster in Kentucky in decades, only one area out of many 
established a formal regional structure. This fact demonstrates that established 
regions will not instantaneously emerge during a disaster.  
During the ice storm in 2009, the one formal region that did form reduced 
the burden on the state EOC because the counties were working in concert with 
one another to allocate resources and the area command center was able to 
process information as a region. Instead of being sent directly to the state EOC, 
each county’s requests were examined by the area command center to 
determine whether the requests could be fulfilled within the region or whether 
duplicate requests existed. Only in cases where requests could not be fulfilled by 
regional resources were requests forwarded to the state EOC. Unfortunately, 
formal regionalization was not utilized by any other region impacted by the ice 
storm. Despite efforts made in Kentucky Emergency Management Region 1, the 
state EOC was still bombarded with requests that might otherwise have been 
fulfilled without relying on the state EOC if regionalization had been implemented. 
If leaders implement regionalization, future response efforts could benefit. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 What were the roles, relationships, and perceptions of leaders fostering 
regionalization during the 2009 Kentucky ice storm, and what can this 
case study tell us about how to better implement regionalization during a 
large-scale crisis? 
¾ What were the challenges and opportunities for leaders seeking to 
implement a coordinated regionalization response during the 2009 ice 
storm? 
¾ What were the different perceptions among leaders regarding the role that 
leaders played in promoting regionalization during the 2009 ice storm? 
 How did established regions (Emergency Management, Hospital 
Preparedness Program) assist leaders in creating a regional response 
during the ice storm? 
¾ Did leaders network or collaborate in any way before or during the 
response? 
C. ARGUMENT  
Coming together is a beginning. Keeping together is progress. 
Working together is success. 
-Henry Ford 
Literature supports the idea that regionalization can improve resource 
allocation. Regionalization could improve resource allocation by allowing local 
leaders more control of resources within the area as well as by reducing the 
amount of time for resource delivery if equipment is prepositioned within the 
region. Establishing formal regionalization can also allow regional leaders to 
make resource allocation decisions without involving the state EOC. Especially in 
tough economic periods, regionalization can assist counties in sharing precious 
resources. 
In the context of the Kentucky 2009 ice storm, utilizing regionalization 
would have allowed counties to work together and optimize the resources within 
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the region. The state EOC would also have benefited if regionalization had been 
established statewide: they would have dealt with 11 regions, instead of 120 
individual counties. The region itself would have had more control of resources 
by working together within the region, and the state would have received 
situational awareness reports and requests from each region instead of each 
county. Redundant requests from counties would hopefully be reduced: i.e., if a 
water treatment plant that covers multiple counties needs a generator and asks 
county “A” and county “B” to fulfill the request for the same purpose, without a 
regional coordination center, both of these requests would be submitted to the 
state EOC. Problems such as this can lead to confusion, poor resource 
utilization, and possibly delayed response. 
If leaders fail to play a crucial role in regionalization and the concept is not 
well understood by leaders, then expectations for regionalization in future 
responses may not be met. Although the concept of regionalization for Kentucky 
is not a new concept, only one area during the ice storm set up an area 
command structure to ascertain the needs of the counties within the region and 
to help with resource allocation. As an example, the KYEM area manager in 
Region 1 requested that all of the counties within her jurisdiction report to the 
Region 1 area command center instead of contacting the state EOC directly. In 
the Region 1 command center, situation reports and requests were collected 
from all counties and submitted to the state EOC. This arrangement allowed the 
region to more easily prioritize needs, minimize duplicate and redundant efforts, 
and promote collaboration and resource sharing throughout the counties. The 
Area 1 command center was able to stage resources closer to the impacted 
areas and coordinate response activities over multiple counties. Other counties 
within the state may have partnered together; however, only one region out of 11 
formally utilized the concept of regionalization during the ice storm. 
Research indicates that collaborative leadership is necessary for 
regionalization; however, this concept goes beyond the formal role of leaders as 
defined by titles, plans, and organizational charts. Regionalization requires 
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leaders to exert influence over areas, organizations, and key players where 
formal authority may not be defined (Lichtenstein et al., 2006; Marcus, Dorn, & 
Henderson, 2005). During the ice storm, leaders did not have comprehensive 
plans to address regionalization, and they may have had misperceptions of what 
regionalization entails. As discussed in the literature review, Waugh and Streib 
point out that, with regard to disasters, emergency managers “generate a strong 
desire for hierarchy—somebody to take charge, or possibly someone to be held 
accountable” (Waugh & Streib, 2006).  
Regionalization is important for Kentucky, as well as other rural states, to 
determine how resources could be better allocated, how information could be 
shared, and how networking between leaders and responders could be 
enhanced. Several formal regions exist throughout the state, including Kentucky 
emergency management regions, hospital preparedness regions, area 
development districts, and American Red Cross service areas, just to mention a 
few of the major players throughout the ice storm response. Although regions 
exist in Kentucky, if the leaders do not perceive that the currently defined regions 
are conducive to regionalization, they may not embrace regionalization. 
Regionalization requires collaborative responses: as a result, regionalization 
requires that leaders and responders be collaborative or support collaborative 
behavior. However, collaboration itself does not guarantee regionalization any 
more than the existence of regions will guarantee regionalization. Collaboration is 
only a prerequisite for regionalization.  
Even if leaders embrace collaborative behavior, regionalization may fail to 
materialize if leaders have negative perceptions of regionalization. Despite what 
is known about regionalization from the current literature, some leaders may not 
be familiar with the concept or the benefits. Even if leaders support 
regionalization, there may exist barriers that prevent them from formally 
regionalizing. Responders also need to understand the concept and be willing to 
adopt regionalization.  
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Evidence related to collaborative response during the ice storm are found 
throughout after-action reports. These reports show what agencies collaborated 
during the storm, and the reports can be compared among various agencies to 
gauge collaboration. This evidence may demonstrate whether some agencies 
collaborated more than others or, if they worked in isolation, may indicate how 
well leaders embraced collaboration as a part of their respective agencies’ 
responses.  
In Kentucky, we have planned together to respond in a regional front as 
Hospital Preparedness Program regions as well as emergency management 
regions. However, without key leaders willing to “pull the trigger” and make 
regionalization happen, we will continue to respond with a fragmented county-by-
county approach. A case study of the Kentucky ice storm can distinguish the role 
that leadership might have played in the materialization of regional response 
efforts, explain why collaboration failed to materialize, and result in 
recommendations to increase the use of regionalization.  
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
The current literature establishes the importance of regionalization and the 
types of leadership that seem conducive to regionalization. It does not address 
the current leaders’ perceptions, regionalization efforts, or the method by which 
the theoretical framework from literature can be implemented at the state and 
local level given the current regional environment.  
Previous research identifies the benefits of regionalization and the role of 
collaborative leadership in the twenty-first century. The author’s research hopes 
to identify and assess current leaders and their efforts, knowledge, and 
perceptions in the context of regionalization in Kentucky. Future research may 
focus on testing specific recommendations or verifying whether the perceptions 
and challenges facing leadership in Kentucky are shared in other states.  
Perceptions about regionalization could guide future educational efforts to 
ensure that leaders have a clear view of the benefits of regionalization. By 
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ascertaining the challenges to regionalization, as well as the barriers, leaders 
may be able to develop strategies to address these findings. Addressing the 
challenges and possible perceptions about regionalization may increase the 
likelihood that leaders will adopt a regionalized strategy during the next large-
scale disaster. As previous literature indicates, this could lead to a more efficient 
use of resources by leaders and a more effective disaster response. 
Immediate consumers would encompass Kentucky leaders, including local 
emergency management directors, KYEM area managers, the Division of 
Emergency Management, local public health officials, the Kentucky Department 
for Public Health, the American Red Cross, hospitals, EMS, fire, police, elected 
officials, lawmakers and participants in the Hospital Preparedness Program. 
Secondary consumers would include leaders, responders, and decision makers 
in rural areas or rural states.  
By understanding the barriers to regionalization in Kentucky, homeland 
security leaders in other states can assess their own leadership and possibly 
address similar challenges. They may also benefit from any recommendations 
made. This research will help national leaders to recognize the gap between the 
theory and practice.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following literature review encompasses three major areas: 
regionalization, leadership, and the 2009 Kentucky ice storm. The literature 
primarily includes peer-reviewed journal articles, special reports issued by 
universities and think tank organizations, official government publications 
including the Government Accountability Office and FEMA, press releases, and 
publications by government organizations such as the Council of State 
Governments.  
A. REGIONALIZATION 
Understanding how regionalization is defined and characterized by 
researchers will provide a strong foundation for examining the regions that exist 
in Kentucky. Exploring the benefits and challenges of regionalization may provide 
a framework to evaluate the possible successes and failures of previous disaster 
responses.  
According to the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the 
National Response Framework (NRF), area command “is an organization to 
oversee the management of multiple incidents handled individually by separate 
Incident Command System organizations or to oversee the management of a 
very large or evolving incident engaging multiple Incident Management Teams. 
An Agency Administrator/Executive or other public official with jurisdictional 
responsibility for the incident usually makes the decision to establish an Area 
Command.” (USDHS, 2008, p. 62). The NIMS document goes on to state that 
area command is typically utilized for large-scale incidents that involve a variety 
of responders and is used “when a number of incidents of the same type in the 
same area are competing for the same resources” (USDHS, 2008, p. 62). 
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Responsibilities of an area command include: 
• Development of broad objectives for the impacted area(s); 
• Coordination of the development of individual incident objectives 
and strategies; 
• (Re)allocation of resources as the established priorities change; 
• Ensuring that incidents are properly managed; 
• Ensuring effective communications; 
• Ensuring that incident management objectives are met and do not 
conflict with each other or agency policies; 
• Identifying critical resource needs and reporting them to the 
established EOC; 
• Ensuring that short-term “emergency” recovery is coordinated to 
assist in the transition to full recovery operations (USDHS, 2008, p. 
63). 
B. DEFINING AND CHARACTERIZING REGIONALIZATION 
In defining regions, three approaches emerge from the literature. One 
approach defines a region in terms of political or geographical boundaries. 
Another defines a region from the perspective of stakeholders in the area. 
Finally, regions may be defined in terms of effectiveness.  
1. Geographical Boundaries  
The National Preparedness Guidelines address regions in terms of 
political and geographic boundaries. A “region” generally refers to a geographic 
area consisting of contiguous federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial 
jurisdictions. Major events often have regional impact; therefore, prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery missions require extensive regional 
collaboration (USDHS, 2007, p.18). 
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2. Stakeholders  
In “Regional Disaster Resilience: A Guide for Developing an Action Plan,” 
a region is defined from the point of view of the stakeholders: 
 
Any area that is defined as such by resident stakeholders 
responsible for disaster preparedness and management. A region 
can be a municipality, a single state (or province), or a portion of a 
state and may be multi-jurisdictional or cross national borders. 
Regions generally have certain accepted cultural characteristics 
and geographic boundaries and tend to coincide with the service 
areas of the infrastructures that serve them. (Infrastructure Security 
Partnership, 2006, p. 2)  
C. BENEFITS AND OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY 
REGIONALIZATION  
The federal government has also emphasized the benefits of 
regionalization. The Department of Homeland Security’s “National Preparedness 
Guidelines,” states that the federal government should encourage regional 
preparedness:  
Formal arrangements among geographic regions will enable the 
Federal Government, working with states, territories, local and tribal 
governments, and other partners, to coordinate preparedness 
activities more effectively, spread costs, pool resources, disburse 
risk, and thereby increase the overall return on investment. 
(USDHS, 2007, p. 12) 
William Dodge, the previous executive director of the National Association 
of Regional Councils, identifies successful examples of disaster response on the 
part of the government agencies and credits regional cooperation. When 
devastating events occur in a community, more than likely surrounding 
jurisdictions will respond if they are able. Dodge points out that “regional 
cooperation became a life-saving necessity on September 11 and that “first 
responders performed admirably but encountered serious communications, data 
sharing, and coordination challenges” (Dodge, 2002, p. 4).  
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Dodge goes on to explain that regional cooperation existed before 
September 11 in the public and private sector and that citizens understood the 
necessity to cross jurisdictional boundaries to “compete successfully in the global 
economy, protect the air and water quality, and provide roads, transit, airports, 
parks, and other quality-of-life amenities. They had even begun to come together 
to shape sensible regional growth to avoid squandering increasingly scarce 
resources on profligate sprawl” (Dodge, 2002, p. 4).  
Chad Foster, a special projects coordinator for the Emergency 
Management Accreditation Program, who wrote a report for the Council of State 
Governments, claims that sharing information across jurisdictional boundaries 
creates advanced situational awareness and can lead to better informed 
decisions (Foster, 2006, p. 10). 
The report “Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can 
Enhance Emergency Preparedness” documents a study on six areas and has 
determined three benefits of regionalization that present opportunities for leaders 
to improve or enhance their response: 
 Regional organizations serve as a great forum to discuss 
policy problems and research a consensus on potential 
solutions. 
 Regions establish their own identity and membership for the 
collaborative process to succeed. 
 Regions assist in solving resource allocation issues (United 
States House of Representatives, 2004, pp. 5–6). 
D. CHALLENGES OF REGIONALIZATION 
If regionalization has been recognized as a positive approach to planning 
and responding to disasters, how can we cultivate regional response? Dodge 
claims that states and the federal government support local responders but have 
yet to promote regionalization (Dodge, 2002, p. 6). He suggests that the federal  
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government could enhance and encourage regionalization by offering grants to 
regional jurisdictions but that it has made few regional grants available (Dodge, 
2002). 
The report “Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can 
Enhance Emergency Preparedness” also notes that the federal government can 
promote regional coordination: “in particular, through its grant design and 
requirements, it encourages structure and practices associated with effective 
regional efforts” (United States House of Representatives, 2004). Other literature 
indicates that leadership could play a key role in successful regional 
coordination.  
E. ESTABLISHED REGIONS IN KENTUCKY  
Kentucky has a multitude of regions and districts throughout the 
Commonwealth ranging from governmental agencies to nonprofit regions. A 
snapshot of regions pertinent to disaster preparedness and management will be 
discussed to provide a foundation. 
1. Area Development Districts  
Kentucky has fifteen area development districts (ADD), covering all 120 
counties within the commonwealth. The ADDs were formed in the early 1970s as 
an asset to stakeholders and citizens of their respective region (Kentucky Council 
of Area Development Districts [KY Council], 2009). The mission of each ADD is 
to “bring local civic and governmental leaders together to accomplish major 
objectives and take advantage of opportunities which cannot be achieved or 
realized by those governments acting alone” (KY Council, 2009). Each of the 
fifteen ADDs are governed by local elected officials and nonelected officials from 
the region’s social and economic agencies (KY Council, 2009). 
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2. Kentucky Emergency Management Regions  
The Kentucky Division of Emergency Management has 11 regional offices 
covering the commonwealth (KYEM, 2010a). Eleven emergency management 
area managers collaborate with the county-appointed emergency management 
director during planning periods, as well as responding to emergencies.  
3. Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP)  
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax 
attacks, the federal government has become more focused on enhancing 
healthcare systems at the local level. A survey conducted in November 2001 
revealed that rural hospital responders believed their hospital was not prepared 
at all for a biological weapons attack, and urban hospitals felt only partially 
prepared. Not only did rural responders feel that they were not prepared, they 
lacked the basic necessary equipment to decontaminate victims. Rural hospitals 
surveyed did not have decontamination stations that could accommodate 10 to 
15 casualties at one time (United States Department of Health and Human 
Services [USDHHS], 2002). 
With a proactive approach to bioterrorism, Congress authorized funding 
through the Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund to support 
bioterrorism planning for civilian populations. This funding allowed the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) to award money to states to 
develop “regional plans to improve the capacity of hospitals, their emergency 
departments, outpatient centers, EMS systems and other collaborating health 
care entities for responding to incidents requiring mass immunization, treatment, 
isolation and quarantine in the aftermath of bioterrorism or other outbreaks of 
infectious disease” (USDHHS, 2002). 
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When the Kentucky Department for Public Health received notification of 
the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP), the decision was made to partner 
with the Kentucky Hospital Association as the state governing agencies. The 
state was divided into 14 HPP regions; since 2002 each region has had varying 
levels of agency participation and success. 
Typical agencies involved in HPP regions throughout the country include 
hospitals, outpatient facilities, health centers, emergency medical services, and 
health departments. In Kentucky, coroners, mental health agencies, the 
American Red Cross, and universities are also represented at regional meetings. 
HPP supports “priorities established by the National Preparedness Goal 
established by the Department of Homeland Security in 2005. The Goal guides 
entities at all levels of government in the development and maintenance of 
capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major 
events, including Incidents of National Significance” (USDHHS, 2010).  
When the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response (ASPR) was created in 2007, the Hospital Preparedness Program was 
moved from HRSA to ASPR (Toner et al., 2009). 
4. Health Departments  
Health departments across the commonwealth consist of either a single, 
independent county health department or are part of a district health department. 
There are 42 self-sufficient independent health departments with human 
resources, payroll, environmental services, disaster preparedness, and clinical 
services. There are 15 district health departments that serve two to ten county 
health departments. Typically, district health departments have a district office 
that supports each of the county health departments in administrative issues. 
Health departments that are part of a district are accustomed to reporting to the 
district office, and resources are shared among the counties within the respective 
district.  
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5. American Red Cross 
Nationally, the American Red Cross supports “domestic disaster relief; 
community services that help the needy; support and comfort to military 
members and their families; the collection, processing and distribution of 
lifesaving blood and blood products; educational programs that promote health 
and safety; and international relief and development programs (American Red 
Cross, n.d.). 
The American Red Cross in Kentucky is structured differently throughout 
the commonwealth. For example, some chapters oversee one individual county, 
whereas other chapters may cover multiple counties. The local chapters look to 
the Louisville Area Chapter, a regional chapter, to “serve as the lead chapter for 
disaster response for all twenty-one Red Cross Chapters in the state of 
Kentucky” (American Red Cross, 2008). 
F. THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN REGIONALIZATION  
In “Homeland Security Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance 
Emergency Preparedness,” the authors note that “regional leadership or 
traditions that are focused on achieving collaboration can advance regional 
coordination by expanding collaborative efforts throughout a region” (United 
States House of Representatives, 2004, p. 15).  
1. Adaptive Leadership  
In “Complexity Leadership Theory: An Interactive Perspective on Leading 
in Complex Adaptive Systems,” the authors explain that hierarchical views of 
leadership are not appropriate for the complexities of the twenty-first century. The 
authors go on to define the term adaptive leadership, describing it as a “dynamic 
that transcends the capabilities of individuals alone; it is the product of 




understanding (Lichtenstein et al., 2006, p. 2). The authors also distinguish 
between leadership and leaders and note that “leadership is not a leader” but the 
“outcome of relational interactions among agents (Lichtenstein et al., 2006, p. 2). 
2. Meta-Leadership  
In “Meta-leadership and National Emergency Preparedness Strategies to 
Build Government Connectivity,” the authors seem to echo the views of 
Lichtenstein et al. by declaring that a different brand of leadership is a necessity 
for terrorism preparedness (Marcus, Dorn, & Henderson, 2005, p. 43). These 
authors stress the difference between traditional, organizational leadership and 
meta-leadership. Organizational leaders, they claim, derive their power and 
influence from their job and position, while meta-leaders encourage people and 
organizations to push beyond their day-to-day interests and activities (Marcus, 
Dorn, & Henderson, 2005, pp. 45–46.) 
3. Collaborative Leadership  
Russ Linden, a management educator writing for the Leader to Leader 
Institute, corroborates the sentiments of many of the previous authors by noting 
that “our notion of a leader must broaden.” Linden defines collaborative 
leadership as the “art of pulling people together from different units or 
organizations to accomplish a task that none of them could accomplish—at all or 
as well—individually” (Linden, 2003). The concept of regionalization provided in 
William Austin’s thesis on homeland security and regionalization seems to mirror 
Linden’s notion of collaborative leadership: 
Regionalization at some level provides the opportunity to use 
mutual aid resources and deploy response assets that a single 
municipality acting alone may not even know exist. Arguably it 
provides a more effective and efficient use of resources, but it 
defines the human nature of the local government culture. (Austin, 
2006, p. 21) 
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Waugh and Streib also discuss the importance of collaborative leadership 
in the journal article “Collaborative and Leadership for Effective Emergency 
Management” published in Public Administration Review. The authors define 
collaborative leadership as “a foundation for dealing with both natural and 
technological hazards and disasters and the consequences of terrorism. They 
also point out the relationship between collaboration and networks by stating that 
“collaborative networks are a fundamental component of any emergency 
response (Waugh & Streib, 2006). 
G. LEADERSHIP, REGIONALIZATION, AND NETWORKS  
In “Leading Public Sector Networks: An Empirical Examination of 
Integrative Leadership Behaviors,” the authors examine the differences in 
behavior between leaders acting within their agency, as opposed to within their 
respective network (Silvia & McGuire, 2010). According to the International 
Network of Social Network Analysis (INSNA), “social network analysis is focused 
on uncovering the patterning of people’s interaction (Freeman, 2008).  
Bruce Hoppe and Claire Reinelt apply social network analysis tools to 
evaluate leadership in the context of networks. The authors define four different 
types of leadership networks and pose questions that can be utilized to evaluate 
each type of leadership network (Hoppe & Reinelt, 2009). The authors’ focus is 
specifically on leadership, and while they look at various organizations, 
regionalization is not addressed.  
Throughout “Interorganizational Coordination in Dynamic Context: 
Networks in Emergency Response Management,” the author addresses the 
importance of networking during a large-scale event, utilizing tools from social 
network analysis to derive metrics and to create network visualizations. The 
author’s research “found that effective response and recovery require well-
coordinated inter organizational networks and trust between government 
agencies at all levels and between the public and private sectors” (Kapucu, 2005, 
p. 33). 
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In the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, David 
Call surveyed county emergency managers on three areas related to ice storm 
responses, including hazard awareness, planning, and hypothetical responses to 
the storms. The focus of the emergency managers was not from the context of 
regionalization, but their findings about the perceptions of establishing central 
command centers are interesting. Call found that during ice storms the 
establishment of central command centers ranked number two among all other 
priorities, second only to communication with utility companies (Call, 2010). Call 
also observes that “urban Emergency Managers were significantly more likely to 
open a central command center than rural Emergency Managers” (Call, 2010, 
p. 8). 
Jixia Yang and Kevin Mossholder examined perceptions of trust in 
organizations and found four variants of trust (Yang & Mossholder, 2010). In 
“Disaster and Emergency Management: Canadian Nurses’ Perceptions of 
Preparedness on Hospital Front Lines,” the authors examined nurses’ 
perceptions in terms of their confidence rating of their level of preparedness, 
awareness of hospital plans, perceptions of their risk, and access to resources 
(O’Sullivan et al., 2008, p. 12). Waugh and Streib point out that what emergency 
managers may perceive as a major challenge to leadership in regionalization 
efforts is collaboration. “Collaboration is the way professional emergency 
managers get the job done. That said, disasters and fear of disasters also 
generate a strong desire for hierarchy—somebody to take charge, or possibly 
someone to be held accountable” (Waugh & Streib, 2006, p. 138). 
H. THE KENTUCKY 2009 ICE STORM CASE STUDY 
A review of Kentucky Emergency Management situation reports, the 
Kentucky Department for Public Health situation reports, FEMA documentation, 
and reports from the National Weather Service related to the Kentucky 2009 ice 
storm provides the sequence of events, the size and scope of the disaster, and 
an idea of the agencies involved in the response. The role of the state 
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emergency operation center during the response included fulfilling requests from 
the 120 counties throughout the commonwealth. The situation reports noted that 
Emergency Management Area 1 implemented a regional command as a method 
to assist in coordinating resources. A review of after-action reports and situation 
reports indicates that Area 1 was the only region out of 11 that established a 
regionalization. Further analysis of the after-action reports in terms of responding 
agencies and the key partnerships that evolved will be presented in Chapter IV of 
the thesis.  
On Monday night, January 26, 2009, a winter storm began in southern 
Indiana and Kentucky that devastated the commonwealth of Kentucky. The storm 
started with light freezing drizzle and freezing rain that changed to a sleet-and-
snow mixture, up to six inches in some areas (National Weather Service, 2009b).  
At 9:00 a.m. on January 27, 2009, the entire state of Kentucky was 
covered with a mixture of rain, freezing rain, sleet, snow, and ice, impacting all 
areas of the commonwealth, especially power, communication, water, and the 
transportation infrastructure (KYEM, 2009b). Property throughout the 
commonwealth was also damaged because the weight of the ice caused trees 
and limbs to fall on power lines, homes, and vehicles (National Weather Service, 
2009b). Kentucky Emergency Management had fully mobilized response 
resources and had prioritized response according to life safety, restoration of 
critical infrastructure, and recovery (KYEM, 2009b). Twenty-one National Guard 
Armories activated and 500 guardsmen were mobilized to support state, county, 
and local missions (KYEM, 2009b). Forty-four of the 120 counties in the 




Figure 1.   Ice Accumulations Across Kentucky During the 2009 Ice Storm 
(Source: National Weather Service, 2009a) 
By the end of January 28, 2009, 91 shelters had opened across the state 
and 68 counties had declared a state of emergency (KYEM, 2009f). A regional 
coordination center was established in Emergency Management Area 1 to assist 
in coordinating resources (KYEM, 2009c). Approximately 473,000 customers 
across the commonwealth were without power, and it was estimated to remain 
off for up to three days (KYEM, 2009c). Telephone service, both landline and cell 
service, was unreliable, making resource coordination and situational awareness 
across the state extremely difficult (KYEM, 2009d). Fifty-four water systems 
across the state were affected due to power outages, leaving approximately 
93,000 customers without water (KYEM, 2009e). Interstates across the state 
were clear; however, many local roads were blocked with trees (KYEM, 2009e). 
All sixteen Kentucky State Police posts were involved in weather-related 
response and recovery, and in the Bowling Green area they were utilizing four-
wheelers and chain saws to help clear roadways (KYEM, 2009d). Governor 
Steve Beshear requested that President Barak Obama issue a presidential 
emergency declaration (KYEM, 2009f).  
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The Kentucky National Guard added 400 soldiers to the response, 
bringing the total guardsmen responding to 700 (KYEM, 2009g). Guardsmen 
were in 27 counties, assisting in road debris removal and transporting supplies 
such as water, cots, and generators (KYEM, 2009f). As nightfall approached, 
falling temperatures alarmed responders because of the loss of electricity and 
the lack of heat across the state (KYEM, 2009f).  
Flooding became an issue on January 29, 2009, and the National Weather 
Service issued several flood warnings to locations across the commonwealth 
(KYEM, 2009h). The National Weather Service forecast temperatures to remain 
below freezing, and flooding on the highways remained a concern (KYEM, 
2009i). Statewide approximately 582,000 customers did not have electricity 
(KYEM, 2009i). At noon, the commonwealth received the presidential emergency 
declaration that had been requested on January 28, which would allow the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency to assist with response and recovery 
efforts (KYEM, 2009j). By 15:00, the state emergency operations center in 
Frankfort had received over 200 requests for assistance from counties 
throughout the commonwealth, and resources throughout the state were 
dwindling (KYEM, 2009k). Citizens, government agencies, businesses, and 
schools voiced concerns over the lack of power, telecommunication issues, and 
blocked roadways (KYEM, 2009l). 
On January 29, 2009, the Kentucky National Guard activated an additional 
300 guardsmen, bringing the total number of National Guard activated to 1,000 
(KYEM, 2009l). The guard was to work with state partners and FEMA to establish 
logistic centers and county points of distribution for FEMA supplies (KYEM, 
2009l). Emergency management officials at state and local levels would validate 
all requests to fill orders from within their powers and only pass along requests to 
the state EOC for unmet needs (KYEM, 2009m). 
By January 30, 2009, 178 shelters were open statewide, housing 
approximately 6,400 people (KYEM, 2009o). Necessities such as food, water, 
and supplies were distributed to shelters by state logistic centers (KYEM, 2009n). 
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The Kentucky Division of Emergency Management situation report 
number 30 states, “The emergency Regional Command established in Benton, 
Kentucky has been instrumental in coordinating the deployment of responder 
cots, meals, water, and generator assets in support of assistance to the hardest 
hit citizens” (KYEM, 2009p). 
By 6:00 p.m., the state EOC had processed 326 requests for assistance 
from counties across the commonwealth (KYEM, 2009q). 
The Kentucky National Guard had over 4,000 guardsmen actively involved 
in emergency response missions (KYEM, 2009s). Guardsmen were collaborating 
with emergency management officials and county judge executives across the 
state to validate requests, coordinate the delivery of requests, and report updates 
to the state EOC (KYEM, 2009r). 
Support from outside the state began arriving to assist emergency medical 
services and local public health with response. Twelve emergency management 
aid compacts (EMAC) had been processed by the state EOC and included 
medical and public health support from North Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, 
and Tennessee (KYEM, 2009t).  
February 1, 2009, brought warmer temperatures to the commonwealth 
(KYEM, 2009u). Roadways continued to be cleared by the Kentucky National 
Guard, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Kentucky Division of Forestry, county 
personnel, and private entities (KYEM, 2009u). The Army Corps of Engineers 
also assisted with moving over 100 generators to be utilized in critical 
infrastructure facilities and shelters (KYEM, 2009u). The state EOC continued to 
receive requests for assistance from counties across the state.  
Since 362,466 customers throughout the state were still without power, 
210 shelters remained open, housing approximately 6,587 people (KYEM, 
2009v). Ninety-three of Kentucky’s 120 counties had declared a state of 
emergency (KYEM, 2009v).  
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The Kentucky Department for Public Health reported to the state EOC that 
FEMA had approved Health and Human Service Community Assessment teams 
to be deployed to assist with shelter morbidity (Kentucky Department for Public 
Health [KYDPH], 2009a). The state medical examiner reported 23 ice storm–
related deaths, including nine suspected of carbon monoxide poisoning. Poison 
Control reported that 208 people had potentially been exposed to carbon 
monoxide because of misuse of alternate heating sources and 75 had been 
admitted to the hospital (KYDPH, 2009a). 
By 18:00 on February 3, the state EOC had taken 867 requests from 
resource managers: 636 had been completed, 89 were waiting assignment, and 
21 needed assignments (KYEM, 2009w). Ninety-six counties, 80% of the state, 
had declared a state of emergency (KYEM, 2009w). By February 5, ten long-term 
care facilities and one hospital within the state were still operating on generators 
(KYDPH, 2009b). 
Carbon monoxide education remained a problem. The Poison Control 
Center reported receiving 238 calls regarding carbon monoxide and the state 
medical examiner had identified 10 suspected carbon monoxide poisoning 
deaths. AT&T’s texting capability was leveraged, and the company agreed to 
send a text message to all phone users in the area not to use generators in 
enclosed spaces (KYDPH, 2009b). 
On February 6, 2009, 20,600 Kentuckians remained without power, and 
two long-term care facilities remained on generators (KYDPH, 2009c).  
By February 5, 2009, the state medical examiner’s office had identified 33 
deaths attributed to the ice storm, including carbon monoxide poisoning, 
hypothermia, motor vehicle accidents, an ambulance unable to reach the victim’s 
location, house fires, falls, and patients reliant on oxygen with no electricity 
(KYDPH, 2009d). 
Strike teams from across the state began to be demobilized (KYDPH, 
2009d). 
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On February 27, during recovery efforts throughout the commonwealth, 
FEMA put out a press release with staggering statistics (FEMA, 2009a): 
The Biggest. The storm has been called the most widely damaging 
Kentucky weather event in the commonwealth’s modern history. Assessment 
teams from local governments, Kentucky Emergency Management, and FEMA 
returned estimates that push the total damage figure past $214 million. 
The First. In response to the storm, Governor Steve Beshear made the 
first-ever total call-up of the Kentucky National Guard. He activated the 
commonwealth’s entire Army National Guard and units of the Air National Guard. 
Altogether, 4,100 troops deployed in the largest call-up for a state disaster in 
Kentucky National Guard history.  
The Worst. The 36 deaths classed as storm-related made this the 
commonwealth’s most lethal ice storm in memory, and one of its deadliest 
modern events. 
The Most. When more than 160 emergency generators were placed in 
critical facilities across Kentucky, partnering FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, and Kentucky Emergency Management, the campaign became the 
largest of its kind in the history of the Corps of Engineers. 
The Cutting Edge. When FEMA communications teams in convoys of high-tech 
vehicles responded to help Kentucky’s emergency communications network, 
Kentucky Emergency Management broke new ground in terms of partnering with 
FEMA and innovating to meet fast-changing needs.  
Recovery was an obstacle, with more than 19 million cubic yards of 
debris. FEMA provided $52,421.05 in grant funding to assist 92 counties in 
removing ice storm debris (FEMA, 2009c). 
A review of after-action reports provides an indication of the scope of the 
ice storm and the agencies involved in the response. However, the 
documentation leaves gaps in terms of providing a thorough identification of the 
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leaders, their actions, and the consequences of their decisions. For the purpose 
of uncovering more interesting dynamics, interviews will be conducted with 
leaders.  
I. GAPS IN REGIONALIZATION AND LEADERSHIP LITERATURE  
Literature establishes the importance of regionalization and the types of 
leadership that seems conductive to regionalization, but it does not particularly 
address the current state of leadership and regionalization efforts or how the 
theoretical conclusions from literature can be implemented at the state and local 
level given the current leadership environment. The author’s experience related 
to the recent ice storm indicates that regionalization efforts were only 
implemented in one area of the commonwealth. Given the almost state-wide 
disaster and the extent of the damage, literature indicates that regionalization 
efforts could have been beneficial if implemented. This research seeks to 
address these gaps by ascertaining the current perceptions of leaders in regard 
to collaboration and regionalization efforts in Kentucky. 
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III. METHODOLOGY  
In this chapter, I will explain the methodology used for assessing leaders’ 
perceptions of regionalization in relation to the Kentucky ice storm, as well as the 
possible impact of leaders’ perceptions on regionalization during the storm and in 
the future. The research for this thesis was a bifurcated approach: a case study 
was conducted of the 2009 Kentucky ice storm and interviews with leaders in the 
response were undertaken.  
A case study was completed by reviewing the Kentucky Emergency 
Management situation reports and health department after-action reports. These 
documents allowed a deeper understanding of the timeline, the events that 
occurred, the agencies that collaborated together during the event, and the 
extent of regionalization practiced as part of the response to the storm. Since the 
commonwealth as a whole was affected, and only one area formally regionalized, 
this event allows the examination of factors that may affect why regionalization 
occurs.  
While the case study was used to ascertain the environment, the use of 
after-action reports does not provide detailed information regarding key leaders 
or their role or influence on or their perceptions of regionalization. To ascertain 
this information, twelve in-depth interviews were conducted with Kentucky 
individuals who had been leaders during the ice storm, in order to obtain specific 
knowledge about the role that leaders’ perceptions played in the response. Each 
participant played a lead role in the response to the storm and had influence on 
plans and policies within his or her respective jurisdiction. Interview questions 
focused on each participant’s perceptions and understandings of regionalization 
and how those may have impacted response actions.  
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A. SAMPLE 
Each health department that submitted an after-action report to the 
Kentucky Department for Public Health was emailed a request to share its 
respective report for this thesis. Out of the sixteen reports, thirteen consented to 
share.  
Table 1.   Health Departments That Submitted After-Action Reports  
Health Department  
Christian County Health Dept.  
KY Dept. for Public Health  
Garrard County Health Dept. 
Mercer County Health Dept. 
Barren River District Health Dept. 
Green River District Health Dept. 
Franklin County Health Dept.  
Lexington-Fayette County Health Dept. 
Lincoln Trail District Health Dept. 
Marshall County Health Dept.  
Lawrence County Health Dept.  
Pennyrile District Health Dept. 
Buffalo Trace District Health Dept.  
The Department for Emergency Management was asked to share the 
after-action report from the 2009 ice storm; however, as of September 2010, the 
document was still in draft form and would not be released. In lieu of the after-
action report, Kentucky Emergency Management provided the situation reports 
as documentation that could be utilized.  
To ascertain information not provided in the situation reports, 12 
interviews were conducted with key leaders from the 2009 ice storm. 
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Table 2.   Interview Participants  
 
Agency No. of Interviews Conducted 
American Red Cross 
 1 
District Health Departments 
 3 
Emergency Medical Service 
 1 
Kentucky Emergency Management Area Manager 
 1 
Local Health Department 
 2 





B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The following interview questions were posed to each of the 12 
participants: 
 I am interested in studying the dynamics of the 2009 Kentucky ice 
storm. Could you tell me about your experience in that response? 
• What was your role? 
• What were the response successes? 
• What were the response failures? 
 I would like to learn more of what you think of regionalization. For 
my research, I have defined a region as a group of counties 
throughout Kentucky that have been established by a state-level 
government. I will refer to regionalization as the act of the region 
collaboratively working to plan and respond to an incident. In your 
opinion, did your area formally regionalize during the ice storm?  
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IF YES, Regionalized: 
 Since your area regionalized, what was the impact on the response 
effort?  
• What regions did your agency collaborate with?  
• Why do you think regionalization occurred?  
 Hypothetical question: Imagine that your area did not regionalize, 
how would that have impacted the response? 
 What role did leaders play in promoting regionalization during the 
ice storm? 
 Would you say that leaders had a negative or positive impact on 
regionalization during the ice storm? 
 What region (HPP, ADD, EM) would be the appropriate agency to 
promote regionalization? 
 How can regionalization be promoted for future large scale events? 
IF NO, Did Not Regionalize: 
 
 Did you in any way collaboratively work with and plan with any 
agency in your area prior to the ice storm?  
• Why do you think regionalization did not occur?  
 Hypothetical question: Imagine that your area did regionalize, how 
would that have impacted the response? 
 What role did leaders play in promoting regionalization during the 
ice storm? 
 Would you say that leaders had a negative or positive impact on 
regionalization during the ice storm? 
 What region (HPP, ADD, EM) would be the appropriate agency to 
promote regionalization? 
 How can regionalization be promoted for future large-scale events? 
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C. DATA COLLECTION 
All interviews were conducted in late August through September 2010, 
were face to face or via telephone call, and ranged between 30 minutes to 120 
minutes. All interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed to ensure accurate 
quotes. Interview participants were granted anonymity to encourage openness 
and honesty.  
Interview participants were selected by the author’s previous knowledge of 
leaders to the ice storm. The author also asked for recommendations from 
professional acquaintances on possible interview candidates.  
The interviews were utilized to determine: 
1. Why regions formed or did not form during the ice storm. 
2. How leaders might have impacted regionalization during the storm 
by: 
a. Understanding the perceptions of regionalization; 
b. Ascertaining the knowledge of current regions; 
c. Addressing challenges and opportunities that exist with 
through pursuing regionalization.  
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
The Kentucky Emergency Management reports were compressed into one 
fluid document that details the events of the ice storm. Health department after-
action reports were analyzed for those regions that each respective agency 
associates with (Hospital Preparedness Program, Emergency Management, and 
Area Development District). Partners mentioned throughout the after-action 
reports were extrapolated and a network visualization was created. 
To analyze the after-action reports, a case study methodology was 
utilized. The case study provided a timeline and detailed descriptions of the 




used to identify which health departments were the most collaborative, which 
partners each agency collaborated with, and which agencies and partners 
appeared to be outliers.  
Each interview was transcribed and reviewed for themes that would 
explain perceptions of regionalization and the role that leaders have in 
implementing regionalization.  
E. CONCLUSION OF METHODOLOGY CHAPTER 
The thesis utilized a case study and interviews to determine leaders’ 
perceptions of the Kentucky ice storm and regionalization. The case study was 
used to better understand the environment in which leaders were acting and the 
partners involved; it also provided a way to measure collaboration and 
regionalization.  
Interviews were utilized to gain perceptions of regionalization through the 
context of the ice storm and to anticipate future large-scale response actions. 
The results provided an indication of why leaders may not have regionalized 





IV. ANALYSIS OF HEALTH DEPARTMENT AFTER-ACTION 
REPORTS 
Health departments across the state played a significant role in the ice 
storm response. Public health nurses worked in shelters; environmentalists were 
called upon to ensure that restaurants with power outages served safe food and 
assisted with boil water advisories; and Medical Reserve Corps volunteers, 
typically associated with health departments, were deployed. It is interesting to 
note from public health after-action reports (AAR) the relationship between the 
public health agencies and responding partner agencies. For my research, a 
region is defined as a group of counties throughout Kentucky that have been 
established by a state-level government, and regionalization is the act of the 
region collaboratively working to plan and respond to an incident. Analysis of the 
AARs will include analysis of the regions, regionalization, best practices, and 
recommendations.  
According to the Kentucky Department for Public Health, 15 local health 
departments across the commonwealth and the Department for Public Health 
submitted an after-action reports for the 2009 ice storm. The table below 
illustrates the willingness of health departments to share their respective after-
action reports for analysis and inclusion in this thesis. 
A. ANALYSIS OF HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM, 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, AND AREA DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT 
REGIONS 
Table 3 indicates the health departments that submitted an after-action 
reports to the Department for Public Health and the regions with which each 
agency is associated. 
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Table 3.   Regions Represented by Health Departments that Submitted After-









Barren River District 
Health Dept. Yes 4 3 Barren River 
Buffalo Trace District 
Health Dept.  Yes 8 7 Buffalo Trace 
Bullitt County Health 
Dept.  No 6 4 KIPDA 
Christian County Health 
Dept.  Yes 2 2 Pennyrile 
Franklin County Health 
Dept.  Yes 14 5 Bluegrass 
Garrard County Health 
Dept. Yes 14 11 Bluegrass 
Green River District 
Health Dept. Yes 3 2 Green River 
KY Dept. for Public 
Health  Yes NA NA NA 
Lawrence County Health 
Dept.  Yes 9 7 Fiveco 
Lexington-Fayette County 
Health Dept. Yes 13 11 Bluegrass 
Lincoln Trail District 
Health Dept. Yes 5 4 Lincoln Trail 
Northern Kentucky 
District Health Dept. No 7 6 
Northern 
Kentucky 
Madison County Health 
Dept.  No 13 11 Bluegrass 
Marshall County Health 
Dept. Yes 1 1 Purchase 
Mercer County Health 
Dept. Yes 14 5 Bluegrass 
Pennyrile District Health 
Dept.  Yes 1 1 Pennyrile 
 
The chart above indicates an overlap among many of the regions. While 
counties included in the Hospital Preparedness Program and Area Development 
District are typically consistent, the Emergency Management Regions do not 
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align. For example, Allen, Barren, Butler, Edmonson, Hart, Logan, Metcalfe, 
Monroe, Simpson, and Warren counties belong to HPP Region 4 and to the 
Barren River Area Development District; however, the Emergency Management 
Region includes the aforementioned counties plus Grayson and Todd.  
The following maps give a geographic visualization of the various formal 
regions represented by agencies that filed after-action reports for the ice storm 
(indicated by an “X”). 
 
Figure 2.   Kentucky Emergency Management Regions Represented in 




Figure 3.   Kentucky Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) Regions 




Figure 4.   Kentucky Area Development District (ADD) Regions 
Represented in After-action Reports (Source: 
http://www.kcadd.org/District_Contacts.html) 
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The maps in Figures 2, 3, and 4 indicate that the majority of Kentucky’s 
regions are represented by health department AARs. The region most often 
represented includes the HPP Region 14 and the Bluegrass ADD. Emergency 
management regions are more evenly distributed in terms of health departments 
that provided after-action reports.  
In addition to mapping AARs to the regions established throughout the 
commonwealth, it is also interesting to note the severity of the ice storm related 
to each area. The figure below indicates the geographic intensity of the ice storm 
throughout the state. 
 
Figure 5.   Ice Accumulations Across Kentucky During the 2009 Ice Storm 
(Source: National Weather Service, 2009a) 
Table 4 utilizes the information provided by the National Weather Service 
to indicate the severity of the ice storm accumulation experienced by each health 
department across the Commonwealth. Approximately half of the ice storm AARs 
are from health departments that experienced the most severe ice accumulation.  
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Table 4.   Ice Accumulation and Health Departments  
Agency Approximate Ice Accumulation 
Marshall County Health Department 1.5-2" 
Pennyrile District Health Department 1.5-2" 
Christian County Health Dept.  1-1.5" 
Green River District Health Dept. 1.5-2" 
Barren River District Health Dept. 1.5-2" 
Lincoln Trail District Health Dept. 1.5-2" 
Buffalo Trace District Health Dept.  .5-1" 
Lawrence County Health Dept.  .5-1" 
Lexington-Fayette County Health Department  .5-1" 
Garrard County Health Dept. .5-1" 
Mercer County Health Dept. .5-1" 
Franklin County Health Dept.  .5-1" 
KY Dept. for Public Health  NA 
Mapping the health departments back to their regions indicates the 
regions that experienced the most severe ice accumulations. Hospital 
Preparedness Program Regions 1–5, Emergency Management Regions 1–4, 
and the Purchase Area Development District, Pennyrile Area Development 
District, Green River Area Development District, Barren River Area Development 
District, and Lincoln Trail Area Development District had the most significant ice 
accumulation. A more thorough analysis of AARs in relation to the 
aforementioned regions and responses will be discussed.  
B. REGIONALIZATION 
While formal regions have been established in Kentucky (HPP, EM, Area 
Development Districts) and health departments within those regions were 
involved in response to the ice storm, regionalization as referred to in this thesis 
did not necessarily occur. During the ice storm, only Emergency Management 
Region 1 formally instituted regionalization as part of the response. While only 
one region was noted to formally regionalize, it would be interesting to note  
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whether any aspects of regionalization can be gleaned from the after-action 
reports. In particular, and based on regionalization as defined by this thesis, an 
important aspect of regionalization is collaboration.  
It may be possible to determine an agency’s collaborative culture as a 
result of examining after-action reports. Three local health departments, when 
asked to provide their respective AARs, refused or did not respond to the e-mail 
request. Health departments may have been leery of how the reports would be 
utilized or what negative information may have been included within the analysis; 
in the alternative the health department director may have withheld the report. In 
the fact of health departments that are unwilling to share their AARs, we might 
wonder whether this reflects on the agency’s willingness to collaborate, share 
information, and assess failures and successes with partner agencies, or 
whether it reflects political or bureaucratic barriers that inhibit collaboration. This 
may explain why a health department in Emergency Management Region 1, 
which regionalized, failed to share its after-action report related to the response.  
Health departments that provided their AARs, agencies specifically listed 
as collaborators or partners, are indicated in the chart below. The chart by no 
means includes every health department partner; rather, the agencies are listed 
within their respective after-action reports.  
One method to gauge the level of collaboration for each health department 
may be to identify the agencies that were mentioned within the respective after-
action reports. Did some health departments collaborate with more agencies than 
other health departments? The table below summarizes the number of agencies 
that each health department mentioned collaborating with in its after-action 
report. It is important to note that health departments may have collaborated with 
other agencies; however, the AAR did not reflect those partnerships because 








Table 6.   Total Number of Agencies Health Departments Coordinated With 
Based on After-Action Reports 
Health Department Agency 
Total Agencies 
Coordinated With 
According to AARs 
Christian County Health Dept.  16 
KY Dept. for Public Health  16 
Garrard County Health Dept. 15 
Mercer County Health Dept. 13 
Barren River District Health Dept. 11 
Green River District Health Dept. 10 
Franklin County Health Dept.  9 
Lexington-Fayette County Health Depart. 8 
Lincoln Trail District Health Dept. 8 
Marshall County Health Department 8 
Lawrence County Health Dept.  7 
Pennyrile District Health Dept. 7 
Buffalo Trace District Health Dept.  5 
Total Agencies Mentioned 133 
Based on Table 6, it appears that several health departments collaborated 
with 10 or more outside agencies. The Kentucky Department for Public Health is 
a statewide agency, and it would be expected to be one of the most 
collaborative. Excluding it from the list, we find that three of the remaining top five 
collaborators are from regions that experienced the most intense ice 
accumulations. It is also interesting that Marshall County Health Department, 
from Region 1, where formal regionalization was implemented, collaborated with 
about half as many agencies as Christian County Health Department, which was 
from a region that did not formally regionalize.  
Table 7 indicates the agencies mentioned in health department AARs and 
the number of health departments that listed them within their report.  
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Table 7.   Total Agencies Mentioned in After-Action Reports 
Health Department Partners  Total 
KY Dept. for Public Health 13 
Local American Red Cross 12 
Local Emergency Management 12 
Local Health Dept. 12 
Medical Reserve Corps 10 
Local Hospital 9 
FEMA 6 
KY Division of Emergency Management 5 
Local EMS Agency 5 
County Judge Executive  4 
Local Police Dept. 4 
National Guard 4 
City Mayor 3 
Community Emergency Response Team 
(CERT) 
3 
KY State Police 3 
Local Public Works 3 
Local Sheriff's Office 3 
Region 4 Unified Planning Coalition (EMAC) 3 
KYEM Area Manager  3 
Centers for Disease Control  2 
Dept. of Health & Human Services 2 
KY Hospital Association (KHA) 2 
Local Highway Dept. 2 
Regional Hospital Preparedness Program 
(HPP) 
2 
Area Development District 1 
KY Community Crisis Response Board 1 
KY Dept. for Community Based Services 1 
KY Pharmacist Assoc. 1 
Local County Coroner  1 
Office of the Governor 1 
Total: 133 
Excluding the Kentucky Department for Public Health and local health 
departments, the most collaborative partners mentioned throughout the after-
action reports were the local American Red Cross, the local emergency 
management agency, Medical Reserve Corps volunteers, and local hospitals.  
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C. HEALTH DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES WITH THE MOST 
CONNECTIONS 
An alternative way of viewing the information presented above is in the 
form of a network visualization. According to the International Network of Social 
Network Analysis (INSNA), “social network analysis is focused on uncovering the 
patterning of people’s interaction (Freeman, 2008). In the journal article, 
“Interorganizational Coordination in Dynamic Context: Networks in Emergency 
Response Management,” Naim Kapucu utilized FEMA situation reports from 
September 11 and applied network analysis and visualization to analyze the 
interactions of public and private organizations throughout the response (Kapucu, 
2005). The pattern of interaction between health departments and partnering 
agencies as described in the after-action reports and Table 7 can be visualized 
by the network map below. This map was designed, utilizing NetDraw free 
software, found at http://www.analytictech.com/downloadnd.htm. 
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Figure 6.   Network Visualization of Health Departments’ AARs 
 49
In the network visualization, the red nodes or squares represent health 
department agencies, and the blue nodes represent collaborating partners. Each 
health department node is connected to a partner node based on the 
relationships noted in Table 7. The size of the node is significant and is based on 
the total number of connections or collaborations that each health department 
had with partner agencies. The most collaborative agencies, or the largest red 
nodes, include the Kentucky Department for Public Health, Garrard County 
Health Department, Christian County Health Department, and Mercer County 
Health Department. The local American Red Cross and local emergency 
management agencies are also depicted as larger blue nodes, signifying their 
significant contribution to health departments.  
According to Kapucu, “Actors who have more ties to other actors may 
have access to, and be able to call on, more of the resources of the network as a 
whole” (Kapacu, 2005). Recall that one benefit of regionalization is improved 
access and sharing of resources throughout a region.  
Besides giving an alternative representation of the most collaborative 
agencies, the network visualization also allows viewing of other dynamics that 
are not as easy to see from reading the tables above. It is clear from the network 
visualization that the Kentucky Department for Public Health is one of the few 
agencies connected to the Kentucky State Police, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, and the Department for Health and Human Services, as 
well as being connected to the rest of the nodes within the network. While a few 
agencies are also connected to these partner organizations, the Kentucky 
Department for Public Health is unusual because that node is connected to so 
many other partner agencies, illustrating its dual role as a state health 
department and a partner agency. In essence, that entity seems to serve an 
important role in bringing together various agencies and perhaps sharing their 
knowledge and resources during a response effort.  
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In terms of the role of regions in the ice storm response, the network 
visualization provides interesting insight. On the periphery of the network, only 
the Barren River District Health Department and Green River District Health 
Department mention collaborating with their respective Hospital Preparedness 
Programs, and Lincoln Trail District Health Department was the only health 
department to mention collaborating with its respective area development district. 
It is also interesting to note that the county judge executive was also included on 
the periphery of the network. This finding is interesting because the county judge 
executives were mentioned during the interviews by four leaders as a possible 
hindrance to regionalization during a response because they would not be 
comfortable giving up the power of their county to a region.  
It is also interesting to note how the most collaborative partnering 
agencies appear to have inserted themselves into the core of the network. As 
pointed out, the larger blue nodes have the most connections with health 
departments, and they tend to be local agencies. We also see clustering with 
state and federal agencies, including Kentucky Emergency Management, FEMA, 
and the National Guard. One may argue that it makes sense that the local 
partners will be the ones with the most collaborative connections, due to the local 
nature of disasters. Through the network visualization, it is apparent that among 
health departments, the most collaborative agencies worked with both their local, 
state, and federal partners.  
D. SUMMARY  
While review of the AARs provides some insight into the nature of 
collaboration and regionalization during the ice storm, and a network visualization 
provides a method for analyzing the collaboration, many more questions remain 
that cannot be answered within the reports. It may be feasible to assume that 
some organizations had greater leadership roles with regard to regionalization 
and collaboration, based on the number of agencies they collaborated with 
during the ice storm in the context of the regions in which they were involved. 
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Viewing the AARs in this context, the most collaborative health department 
agencies were from formal regions most heavily affected by the ice storm, 
whether formal regionalization was established or not. The after-action reports do 
not provide any information regarding the characterization of which leaders or 
agencies did a better job responding to the ice storm, or why certain events 
occurred. To address the gaps from AARs, interviews with specific leaders and 
responders will be utilized to specifically characterize leadership and 
regionalization in the context not addressed in the AARs. Specifically, the 
perceptions of leaders regarding regionalization, whether they felt they were 
involved in a formal regional response, successes and failures, why formal 
regionalization may or may not have occurred, and leaders’ suggestions about 
future regionalization efforts will be included.  
Previous chapters raised the point that regions are necessary but not 
sufficient for regionalization. One of the research questions posed in this thesis is 
whether established regions assist leaders in creating a regional response during 
the ice storm. This chapter ties regions in the argument and research questions 
directly to the ice storm. It also helps to identify characteristics of regions 
throughout the commonwealth and provides a framework and context for further 
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V. FINDINGS  
Chapter V addresses the findings from the interviews conducted with 
leaders of the 2009 Kentucky ice storm. Twelve leaders were interviewed, 
identified with the following roles:  
American Red Cross—1 leader  
District and Local Health Department—5 leaders  
Emergency Medical Service—1 leader 
KYEM Area Manager—1 leader 
Local Emergency Management Director—4 leaders 
A. IDENTIFIED RESPONSE SUCCESSES  
Although the ice storm challenged much of the state, response successes 
emerged. An astounding eleven 11 of 12 (91.6%) responders identified paid 
responders, including EMAC teams and the Kentucky National Guard as a 
response success. Volunteers, including volunteer fire departments, Community 
Emergency Response Teams (CERT), Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) and HAM 
radio operators were mentioned by seven leaders (58.3%). Half the leaders also 
stated that local retailers, such as Wal-Mart and locally owned grocery stores, 
were instrumental in providing food and supplies during the response. 
Over half (58%) of the leaders mentioned that the networking before the 
ice storm occurred was instrumental in the success. 
That’s why our response was successful because it was a ground 
level networking and knowing day-to-day who the players are at the 
ground level.1 
We network and meet a lot throughout the year. We train, we 
network, we meet. We have a face that goes with a voice, we have 
all the secret phone numbers.2 
                                            
1 Anonymous emergency medical services official, interviewed by the author on August 30, 
2010.  
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We had worked in advance looking at where resources were stored 
and who the contact for those resources were.3 
Five (41.6%) leaders felt that the shelters located in their respective areas 
were successful. 
One-third reported that local media outlets were very helpful in relaying 
pertinent information to the public, such as shelter locations, food safety 
practices, carbon monoxide information, and chain saw safety. 
One-fourth claimed that political leaders, such as county judge executives 
and mayors, were extremely helpful and assisted with the response efforts. 
One of the mayors gave me their city employees and told me they 
could do whatever I need them to do. I used them as runners and 
helpers, which worked out great. I was told, “Here are my people, 
here are my trucks, do what you got to do to make this work.’”4 
My county judge (executive) stepped up to the plate and had great 
foresight, and our citizens would have suffered if he hadn’t. A local 
mayor put on coveralls and was out operating a log splitter (to help 
remove debris from the road).5 
B. IDENTIFIED RESPONSE FAILURES  
A plethora of themes emerged throughout the interviews conducted on 
response failures. The top reported concerns included communication, resource 
procurement, an overrun state EOC, lack of pet shelter and special medical need 
shelter planning, and the lack of regional leadership. 
                                            
2 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 20, 
2010. 
3 Anonymous American Red Cross official, interviewed by the author on September 9, 2010. 
4 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 
2010. 




One hundred percent of leaders identified communication as a failure 
during the response. Leaders commented that the infrastructure failed as well as 
the personal communications between responders, agencies, and established 
EOCs.  
We had total power outage in our county. We had 48 hours of total 
communication failure and what I mean by that is no landlines, cell 
phones, or radios for fire or police. If we needed something, we had 
to send runners.6 
I did not know where the EOC was. Sometimes we don’t know the 
right questions to ask. I wish I had known at the time so that I could 
have gotten involved in the EOC. Since then, we have made some 
changes.7 
There were problems with shelters. Some (shelters) would open 
and that wasn’t communicated to emergency management. We 
didn’t know they were open, what their environmental or medical 
needs were.8 
I don’t think the state knew how bad it was because we couldn’t 
communicate with them.9 
2. Resource Ordering, Mobilizing, Receiving, Reimbursement  
Seven (58.3%) of the leaders were not satisfied with the procurement of 
resources, and the lack of communication infrastructure hampered resource 
mobilization. During the event, a new online software, WebEOC was utilized to 
order and track resource requests; however, many responders at the local, 
regional, and state level had not been properly trained on the system. Leaders 
were supportive of WebEOC but felt that training on the system was lacking at 
the time of the response. 
                                            
6 Anonymous emergency management official interviewed by the author on September 22, 
2010. 
7 Anonymous American Red Cross official, interviewed by the author on September 9, 2010. 
8 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on September 20, 2010. 
9 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 2010. 
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Western Kentucky had put a request in to Frankfort [the state EOC] 
that they needed 3,000 cots but whoever was entering into 
WebEOC put 30,000 cots. Frankfort said they couldn’t supply it (the 
30,000 cots) and took the entire order out without checking first. 
The software (WebEOC) tracking actually hindered us on this 
response.10 
I requested 300 cots and somewhere along the line, someone else 
had requested 300 cots for my county I didn’t know about. So, I got 
a call from the state EOC, and they told me that my 600 cots would 
be delivered. I said that I only needed 300. The state EOC said that 
they had received two requests from two different people, and I 
explained that one of them was a duplication and I only needed 
300.11 
Three leaders commented on the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency’s (FEMA) reimbursement procedures. One official, because of a lack of 
proper authorization to utilize local resources, did not receive reimbursement 
from FEMA. Another official noted that, after the appropriate paperwork was 
submitted, reimbursement was not timely.  
Our HPP region had purchased about 3,000 blankets as a regional 
asset, and all the blankets were used in the ice storm response. 
The blankets were split up among each of the counties, and 
everyone got an equal portion. We thought that the blankets would 
be reimbursed by FEMA, but we were wrong. When FEMA came 
in, they asked us who instructed us to use the blankets, and the 
answer was common sense, and they told us they wouldn’t 
reimburse us. If the local emergency manager would have been 
contacted and approved the use of the blankets, FEMA would have 
reimbursed us. Since we did not get reimbursed, we do not have a 
stockpile of blankets in our HPP region.12 
FEMA came in quick, which was good, but the payment wasn’t as 
quick as everyone would have liked it to be. They want you to go 
through the process—you have to document, document, 
document—you have to show FEMA everything you purchased,  
 
                                            
10 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 17, 
2010. 
11 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 20, 
2010. 
12 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on August 27, 2010. 
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everything you went through. You have to keep every receipt and 
document everything you can. This isn’t a response failure but it 
took a long time for reimbursement.13 
These negative encounters with FEMA may have impact on future 
response efforts. Leaders may not be as willing to utilize local resources that 
must be replaced for fear that FEMA will not provide reimbursement. Local 
officials may be hesitant to allocate funding to the response because proper 
documentation may not be conducted or reimbursement from FEMA may be 
delayed.  
3. The State EOC Was Overrun  
Half the leaders reported that the state EOC was overwhelmed with the 
number of counties affected and the number of requests that were submitted to 
one location. 
In our county, we had no outside help for the first eight days. For 
eight days, we ran this county by ourselves, no outside help. We 
did not have state or federal help until eight days in. The state was 
a failure during the ice storm. Any time a county in the 
commonwealth goes for eight days without being contacted by the 
state, something’s wrong.14 
As far as I’m concerned, the breakdown was at the state level. 
They were understaffed and undertrained.15 
Three leaders noted that. although the current protocol is that any 
requests at the county level are to be sent to the county EOC and forwarded on 
to the state EOC, this process was botched. Elected officials who were not at the 
county EOC called the state EOC, requesting resources and status updates. 
Instead of asking the elected officials to go through the established county EOC, 
the state EOC took the requests. 
                                            
13 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 20, 
2010. 
14 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 
2010. 
15 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 2010. 
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We had mayors that didn’t think things were moving quick enough 
and elected officials would call (the state EOC) and cause 
problems. Whoever had the biggest clout got it done. The way it is 
supposed to work is only the (county) EOC calls the state EOC. I 
think that is where the state EOC needs to tell people to go through 
the local EOC, but the state didn’t tell them that. They took their 
information down, and sometimes it caused more chaos than 
help.16 
When a county needs something, the EOC gets on the phone and 
they call the duty officer (at the state EOC), and they take your 
request for resources, and you tell them what you need. They were 
so overwhelmed, every EOC plus every little city (inside the county) 
was calling the state EOC. Things would get duplicated, and things 
wouldn’t get through. So what should happen in the future is that 
anyone requesting resources should go through the county 
emergency manager (or county EOC).17 
This finding poses a problem to the proper chain of command. If any 
elected official or person in a position of power can call the state EOC and 
request resources, county EOCs and local emergency management 
directors may feel slighted.  
Another leader pointed out that his county did not even activate the 
county EOC. 
We tried to help out with Emergency Management but they really 
didn’t set up any kind of (county) EOC.18 
The state EOC may have felt obligated to take calls and requests from 
leaders not involved in the county EOCs due to the fact that some individual 
counties did not activate an EOC. However, according to two of the interview 
participants, county EOCs were active within their respective county, and the 
state EOC still accepted calls from leaders not associated with the county 
EOC. 
                                            
16 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 
2010. 
17 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 20, 
2010. 
18 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on September 9, 2010. 
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4. Lack of Planning for Special Medical Needs Shelters and Pet 
Shelters 
The lack of plans in place to establish and run special medical needs 
shelters (41.6%) and protocols on how to care for pets and farm animals (50%) 
presented problems during the response. 
Practical special medical needs and sheltering capabilities and 
plans were lacking. Equipment and protocols need to be prepared 
to do something like that for any sustained period of time.19 
Some people (in the shelter) had pets, and the shelters did not take 
any pets. Some older people in the shelters had animals at home 
and were very frantic about their pets. Public health 
environmentalists, on their own, went to people’s homes to give the 
pets food and water.20 
Special-needs shelters goes under the umbrella of the health 
department, but it is foggy what defines a special need.21 
One thing that needs to be done is special-needs shelters. More 
policy and direction needs to be done. We need to be very careful; 
our nurses haven’t been in the clinic for maybe ten years. Common 
thoughts of everyone is that public health has staff that can go in 
and open up a shelter and we can’t. [We] had a lot of people 
dropped off at the shelter that needed medical care. We had a 
special-needs shelter open, but once we were put in the situation, 
we realized quickly that more planning and policies need to be 
developed on how it has to be done.22 
Everything is about money, and our funds only went so far. Special 
needs was an issue that slipped through the cracks. No one 
anticipated public health being put in charge of special-needs 
patients, and [we] didn’t know that public health was going to be 
asked to man all special-needs shelters. No one could define 
special needs without making it so broad that everyone was in 
there [special needs].23  
                                            
19 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on August 30, 
2010. 
20 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on August 27, 2010. 
21 Anonymous American Red Cross official, interviewed by the author on September 9, 2010. 
22 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on September 20, 2010. 
23 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on August 27, 2010. 
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5. Regional Hospital Preparedness Program Trailers 
In late 2007, the Department for Public Health issued medical surge 
trailers to each of the 14 HPP regions. The trailers were equipped with supplies 
to support 25 patients for 72 hours. The medical surge trailers were stocked with 
medical equipment, shelter equipment, and pharmaceuticals. The purpose of the 
trailers is to assist the region during a medical surge, as well as to serve as a 
state asset that can be quickly deployed during a large-scale event. Each HPP 
region was asked to determine an agency within the region to store the trailer.  
One-third of leaders recognized that, while the HPP trailers were a great 
asset, problems did arise because at the time no clear protocol on how to deploy 
the trailers existed.  
It [the medical surge trailer] was a wonderful asset, and everyone 
wanted it, but there wasn’t enough on the trailer to sustain one 
county. We did receive another trailer from an HPP region, but 
even having two medical surge trailers was not enough. The state 
did not have any idea on how to deal with the regional equipment, 
and the program was not thought through. The state did not 
consider how to restock the trailers, they just saw that they put 
regional assets out.24 
They didn’t even want to share the regional trailer. The county that 
had it didn’t want to give it up. I don’t think they really needed it as 
bad as the county that requested it, but they didn’t want to give it 
up.25 
The surge trailer had meds [medication] that were expired.26 
The host site that possessed the trailer and maintained it did not 
want to release it because they were worried they might have a 
future need for it.27 
                                            
24 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on August 27, 2010. 
25 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on September 9, 2010. 
26 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on August 24, 2010. 
27 Anonymous emergency medical services official, interviewed by the author on August 30, 
2010. 
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6. Issues With Regional Emergency Management 
Two leaders commented that at the time of the ice storm, no KYEM area 
manager from emergency management had been named. The quote 
demonstrates the perceived impact to locals that an area manager may have 
during a response.  
[My] area manager had retired, and he had not been replaced. 
When the ice storm hit, I had no idea who my area manager was. I 
had not been contacted by the state before the ice storm, telling me 
who to call for an area manager. One of my [neighboring] counties 
had only 20 people in a shelter, and I had over 500. We both sent 
the same request [for support at the shelter] in at the same time. 
Within 12 hours, he had 18 wheeler trucks full of resources. His 
area manager had sent in his request. About 72 hours later, I finally 
got the resources I ordered. I sent mine in as a county, he went 
through his area manager.”28 
Another leader explained that, because of retirements or vacancies, the 
KYEM area manager’s area had been expanded at the time of the storm. 
We started out with eight counties in our emergency management 
region. There was not an area manager in Region 2 or 3, and 
therefore, the regional response (for Area 1) was expanded to 19 
counties for several days, with no additional state support.29 
C. PREVIOUS PLANNING WITH PARTNER AGENCIES  
Table 8 details the total reported responses, by discipline, of identified 
agencies that each leader collaboratively worked or planned with before the ice 
storm occurred.  
                                            
28 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 
2010. 
29 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 2010. 
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American Red Cross 
1 2 0 0 3 
Emergency Management  3 3 1 1 8 
Emergency Medical Services 
(EMS) 0 0 1 0 1 
Fire Chiefs Association 
 1 0 0 0 1 
Health Departments  
 3 1 0 1 5 
Homeland Security Group 
 1 1 0 0 2 
Hospital Preparedness 
Program 4 5 1 0 10 
Law Enforcement Agencies 
 1 0 0 0 1 
Local Emergency Planning 
Committee (LEPC) 1 0 1 1 3 
Metropolitan Medical 
Response Systems (MMRS) 1 0 0 0 1 
Salvation Army  
 0 0 0 1 1 
Special Ad-Hoc Earthquake 
Planning Group 1 0 0 0 1 
It is apparent from Table 8 that the majority of the interviewed leaders 
participate in or were involved with planning initiatives through the regional 
Hospital Preparedness Program. It is important to note that the Hospital 
Preparedness Program encompasses a plethora of agencies, including hospitals, 
health departments, mental health officials, the American Red Cross, emergency 
medical services, coroners, emergency management, and long-term care 
officials.  
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In the analysis of health department after-action reports, only two health 
departments included the HPP; however in the interviews 10 of the 12 leaders 
mentioned HPP. This may imply that while the HPP program is not utilized as a 
responding organization, the networking and planning that occurs during HPP 
meetings and exercises make an impact on how response is conducted.  
D. REGIONALIZATION  
Three of the participants (25%) reported that their area formally 
regionalized and had an established area command. Six participants (50%) did 
not formally have a regional command set up; however, they did provide 
assistance to areas outside their respective jurisdictions. “We were in contact 
with our surrounding counties and asked if they needed anything, even though 
we didn’t have an area command.”30 One participant commented that while his 
area did not formally regionalize, the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) 
provided a structure for organization. “We talked among the HPP counties, we 
had a lot of personal contacts, and we spread around a health and medical 
disaster resource list that lists every trailer, every piece of equipment, anything 
that could be deployed.”31 Three participants (25%) stated that they did not 
regionalize, and one participant commented, “No, we did not regionalize, it was 
every county for themselves.”32 
Each of the interview participants in the regionalized area attributed the 
implementation of an area command to the prior regional planning and exercises 
that had been conducted. The counties that encompass Emergency 
Management Area 1 were heavily involved in earthquake planning on a regional 
level because of their proximity to the New Madrid fault line. The concept of  
 
 
                                            
30 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by author on September 17, 
2010. 
31 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by author on August 30, 2010. 
32 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by author on August 27, 2010.  
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regionalization was implemented during an earthquake exercise in March 2008 
that involved the Army National Guard. During the exercise, regionalization was 
established and tested. 
Of the interview participants who regionalized, 100% concurred that 
regionalization was beneficial to the response. Themes such as organizational 
structure, accountability, and resource allocation emerged.  
One leader commented that people working at a local county EOC may 
not have seen the impact of regionalization: “Area command was helpful 
depending on your perspective of the situation. Since I am a multicounty 
employee, it was helpful for me. From the perspective of the people working in 
individual counties, they probably saw it as another layer of bureaucracy. 
Everyone had a different take and everyone saw the response from their own 
degree of anxiety and discomfort.33 
Leaders perceived regionalization as a mechanism for promoting 
communication and resource allocation and obtaining resources from the state, 
since the requests were submitted from a larger area rather than a single county. 
It was noted that regionalization may have ultimately helped the state agencies: 
“The regionalization may have helped the state more than it helped us.”34 
E. WHY REGIONALIZATION DID NOT OCCUR 
In trying to understand why regionalization did not occur, three main 
themes emerged: the inability to communicate because of infrastructure failure, 
single counties overwhelmed with their own responses, and political barriers.  
                                            
33 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 2010. 
34 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 2010. 
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1. Inability to Communicate  
Sixty-six percent of leaders of areas that did not regionalize noted that the 
communication failure was a primary reason for not formally regionalizing.  
We couldn’t communicate across county lines to even think about 
regionalizing.35 
We couldn’t communicate with each other or reach some other 
counties for a week. We didn’t know what was going on.36 
2. Counties Were Overwhelmed 
One-third of leaders cited the fact that each county was dealing with its 
own problems and did not have the resources to assist outside jurisdictions.  
Everyone was so overwhelmed in their own county; you couldn’t 
get help from anyone else because they couldn’t get it to you 
anyway.37 
It [the ice storm] was so widespread; there was no need in calling 
the next county over because they were in the same boat I was in. 
Each county was overwhelmed, and people didn’t think beyond 
their county.38 
3. Political Barriers 
One-third of leaders responded that one reason that regionalization did 
not occur was the result of political barriers. “No judge is going to give up what he 
perceives as to be giving up control of his county. Until something legislatively is 
changed and committed a construct under which you could have a unified 
command that has the authority to exercise decision-making over multiple 
counties, I just don’t see it [regionalization] happening.”39  
                                            
35 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on August 27, 2010. 
36 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on September 9, 2010. 
37 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 20, 
2010. 
38 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on August 24, 2010. 
39 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on August 30, 
2010. 
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4. Lack of Training 
Two (16%) leaders recognized that their respective jurisdictions had not 
planned or trained on regionalization.  
5. Lack of Emergency Management Area Managers 
Two interviewees noted that, at the time of the ice storm, the emergency 
management area manager position was vacant. Both leaders felt strongly that if 
a KYEM area manager had been in place, their respective areas would have 
regionalized.  
Other notable reasons for not regionalizing included a weak region that 
existed, personality conflicts present before the ice storm occurred, and the 
realignment of emergency management regions by the Kentucky Emergency 
Management Agency.  
F. HOW REGIONALIZATION MIGHT HAVE IMPACTED THE RESPONSE 
Of the leaders who did not regionalize, three main perceptions emerged 
when they were asked whether regionalization would have impacted the 
response. The themes included obtaining resources more quickly, utilizing 
resources more efficiently, duplication within the county, and reduction in area 
and better communication. 
Six leaders (67%) reported that resources may have been allocated more 
quickly or in a more efficient manner. “They [regionalization] are able to prioritize 
the resources and can look at what is ordered and check to be sure they know 
what you want and why you want it. A regional person has time to reach out to 
the (local) emergency management directors where the state EOC doesn’t have 
time to do that.”40  
                                            
40 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 
2010. 
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Duplication of efforts may have also been reduced, claimed six of the 
leaders. Of the six that identified duplication of efforts, three leaders specifically 
mentioned that duplication of shelters could have been addressed with 
regionalization. 
We had some special medical needs shelters that we could have 
merged people into and not had 60 shelters across the district. We 
could have combined the shelters and had more resources, more 
efficient, better run, with more resources. We could have had 30 
shelters instead of 60.41 
It [regionalization] would have eliminated some of the duplication 
we had. Some counties set up shelters all over the place because 
they didn’t know where the shelters were. We could have combined 
the resources, rather than having them spread out all over the 
place.42 
If we had a huge event and needed a special medical needs 
shelter, we could have a regional special medical needs shelter. If 
we have a small county in the area they might have problems 
setting up a special medical needs shelter. We could bring or move 
people from other impacted counties instead of trying to push 
resources to smaller counties.43 
Fifty-five percent claimed that if their respective area had regionalized, 
communication would have improved. One leader stated that in his/her 
respective county regionalization would not have improved the response.  
G. LEADERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF REGIONALIZATION  
Since leaders are indispensable to implementing regionalization, each 
interviewee was asked to gauge leaders’ perceptions of regionalization during 
the ice storm. Five leaders (41.6%) stated that leaders had a positive impact on 
regionalization. 
                                            
41 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on August 27, 2010. 
42 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on September 9, 2010. 
43 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on August 30, 
2010. 
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Five leaders (41.6%) felt that leaders have a positive and negative impact 
on regionalization: 
The county judge is open to it [regionalization], but he still isn’t 
going to sit around and twiddle his thumbs and wait on other things 
to happen and let our citizens suffer for it. He would be okay with it 
if it worked well but if he didn’t get what he needed, he’s going to 
make it happen.44 
If you have an emergency management director that works for a 
county judge, and the judge doesn’t allow them to work 
cooperatively, you are going to have struggles.45 
[The] majority of people don’t really think about it. The people that 
do think about it have mixed feelings, depending on their job title 
and how their organization is set up. I can see political people 
worrying more about the loss of autonomy and loss of control. The 
political ramifications … maybe it looks like I can be replaced or I’m 
not doing my job or if I am not in charge and someone is going to 
send my resources to a neighboring county, even though I think 
that they are needed worse here.46 
Two (16.6%) stated that leaders had a negative impact on regionalization. 
“It was me and my county, my jurisdiction, my borders.”47 “A lot [of leaders] are 
scared they are going to lose their assets and resources. They see it as giving up 
things that belong to them, whether it is people or supplies or whatever. Some 
people tend to not want to do that.”48 
All leaders were asked about the role of leaders in promoting 
regionalization during the ice storm. Two-thirds (68%) of leaders recognized that, 
before a response, it is imperative that leaders network throughout their 
respective communities. It was also recognized that leaders facilitate pulling  
 
                                            
44 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 17, 
2010. 
45 Anonymous American Red Cross official, interviewed by the author on September 9, 2010. 
46 Anonymous emergency medical service official, interviewed by the author on August 30, 
2010. 
47 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on August 24, 2010. 
48 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on September 9, 2010. 
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agencies together or have the authority to pull people together (50%). Two 
leaders (16%) stated that leaders were resistant to regionalize during the ice 
storm response.  
H. PROMOTING REGIONALIZATION  
Nine of the leaders interviewed (75%) slated Kentucky Emergency 
Management as the lead agency in promoting regionalization. 
Emergency management area managers have to be the ones to 
pull it [regionalization] together. Emergency management is 
associated with all hazards and all responders; they work with all 
agencies.49 
Emergency management, no question about it.50 
When leaders were asked how regionalization could be promoted for 
future large scale events, 58% claimed that education, including case studies, 
was key. Fifty-eight percent also noted that, for regionalization to work, political 
leaders’ buy-in and perhaps legislative action was necessary. Thirty-three 
percent noted that exercise and training on regionalization was essential.  
One leader noted that local responders often are opposed to mandates 
pushed down by a state agency. “When we have the state come down, people 
will be resistant.”51 
I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 Interview data provided by leaders of the ice storm assisted in 
ascertaining response successes and failures; examining why regionalization did 
or did not occur; and provided evidence for regionalization that was not included 
in after-action reports. 
                                            
49 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 17, 
2010. 
50 Anonymous health department official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 2010. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Willing is not enough; we 
must do. 
-Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
This chapter will provide recommendations on strengthening formal 
regionalization within the commonwealth. An important question is how to better 
implement regionalization during a large-scale emergency. As a result of the 
findings, the following recommendations are suggested: 
• Both state agencies and local agencies would benefit from 
regionalization if leaders and responders were trained and staffing 
were adequate. 
• Emergency management should be the lead for regionalization.  
• County emergency management directors should be staffed full-
time. 
• Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) regions created 
relationships and promoted networking before the storm occurred. 
Leaders should be encouraged to attend multidisciplinary 
coalitions.  
• Educating leaders and responders on issues such as 
regionalization, NIMS, and area command are necessary. 
• State laws should be aligned to promote regionalization. 
A. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
The sample size was a relatively small compared to all the leaders and 
agencies involved with the 2009 ice storm. The ice storm occurred early in 2009, 
and the interviews were conducted in late 2010. The participants may not 
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accurately recall events, and they may have been exposed to media and 
professional influences that may have shaped their perceptions. 
The anonymity of leaders made it difficult to map people and agencies to 
regionalization. However, without anonymity, participants may not have been as 
open and forward with information. 
The author had worked on a professional level with four of the leaders, 
and that may have possibly biased their response. 
B. OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONALIZATION, PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE  
The ice storm out west was an excellent example to point out. 
Look, this [regionalization] does work; there are circumstances 
where this makes sense, it’s not usurpation of authority for 
somebody. If it gets bad, this is the most efficient way to do it. If you 
can do this when memories are fresh, it is usually more 
successful.52 
This thesis set out to investigate opportunities for leaders seeking to 
implement a regionalized response. In addition, it was argued that collaboration 
was essential to a regionalized response and that leaders or organizations that 
failed to collaborate might not embrace regionalization. While emergency 
management in Area 1 proved that formal regionalization is successful, there 
have been other examples of informal regionalization and collaboration in which 
Kentucky has benefited from working across jurisdictional boundaries. The 2010 
World Equestrian Games was held at the Kentucky Horse Park in Lexington. 
These international games are held every four years, and this was the first time 
that the event had been held within the United States. State, regional, and local 
leaders planned for months to host the event and to prepare for a variety of 
incidents that could have occurred, including a variety of natural disasters and 
terrorism incidents. Federal, state, and local public health practitioners provided 
environmental and epidemiological support. Law enforcement from the Kentucky 
                                            
52 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on August 30, 
2010. 
 73
State Police, Lexington Police, Louisville Police, and Georgetown Police 
departments collaborated with federal law enforcement officials to assure that 
security and personnel were available for the event. This event highlights the 
benefits to Kentucky from collaboration that occurs when leaders at all levels 
work toward one common goal. 
 The western part of Kentucky lies in the New Madrid seismic fault line. If 
an earthquake were to occur, it has the potential to be much more devastating 
than the 2009 ice storm. The ice storm wreaked havoc on the communication 
infrastructure and the electrical infrastructure; water systems failed because the 
lack of electricity impacted the pumps and roadways due to debris. If an 
earthquake occurred, the aforementioned infrastructures would be impacted, as 
well as interstate petroleum pipelines, natural gas lines, and water and sewer 
lines. Other potential issues include mass casualties, fatalities, sheltering people, 
loss of critical facilities such as hospitals, long-term care facilities, and EOCs. To 
work in a more formal collaborative environment, it is crucial that Kentucky 
leaders begin to provide education on regionalization, develop comprehensive 
plans, and conduct exercises.  
C. REGIONALIZATION VERSUS AREA COMMAND 
The concept of area command differs from regionalization. As discussed 
in Chapter II, area command is a framework established by the federal 
government for a large-scale or regional response. NIMS, however, does not 
address the groundwork that should be established before a response involving 
area command. Collaboration, planning, networking, and exercises should be 
conducted before the response or area command is established. Regionalization 
as presented in this thesis incorporates the planning, networking, collaboration, 
and exercises necessary fill the gap between preparation and execution of area 
command.  
 74
D. BENEFITS TO COUNTIES AND THE STATE EOC 
It was argued that some leaders may not be familiar with the benefits of 
regionalization, and that may have affected the decision to regionalize.  
 I have discussed with the state the utility of creating an area 
command for certain circumstances. Area command should be set 
up during certain events, like if an earthquake hit the western part 
of the state. The state of Florida does it that way, for example when 
they gear up for hurricanes; they divide themselves into areas of 
the state for area command.53  
1. County Benefits  
One idea that emerged from the interviews was that regionalization could 
actually lessen the response burden on individual counties. The status quo of the 
county-by-county approach compartmentalizes and fragments responses. For 
example, at one point there were over 200 shelters opened throughout the state, 
and a plethora of those shelters accommodated special needs. Many of the 
special-needs shelters could have been consolidated to improve service delivery 
and reduce the demand on personnel and resources.  
Regionalization, in the argument statement, was assumed to improve 
resource allocation. For Kentucky, the concept of special-needs shelters is 
relatively new. Comprehensive plans are nonexistent, and the definition of what 
constitutes a special-needs individual has yet to be determined. Almost half the 
leaders interviewed voiced concerns over special-medical-needs shelters and pet 
shelters. Leaders recognized the tremendous amount of resources and staff that 
are required for a special-needs shelter. If regionalization was implemented, 
special-needs shelters, as well as pet shelters, might be less of a burden for 
each individual county. Preplanning could be conducted in each region, and the 
leaders throughout the region could determine the best regional approach to  
 
                                            
53 Anonymous Emergency Management official, interviewed by the author on August 30, 
2010. 
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these problems. Instead of opening a special-needs shelter in each county, 
select counties could be tasked to open a regional special-needs shelter with the 
understanding that people from neighboring counties would be sent there.  
Planning together as a region would also increase the networking 
opportunities among leaders. Increased knowledge of responding partner 
capabilities, resources available within each county and the region, and 
transparent protocols for response could enhance relationships and establish 
trust among agencies, as well as improve the service provided to the citizens of 
the commonwealth.  
2. State EOC Benefits  
You can’t have 120 counties calling you—there is no way that the 
state EOC can handle that. There is no way. You are going to have 
to somehow pare that down, and regionalization is the only thing 
that makes us do that. You have your area managers already set 
up. You can funnel all those requests, all that information, all the sit 
reps [situation reports], all of your recovery plans, all of your 
requests for assistance, all of your damage reports—all of that 
through the regional EOC. Instead of having 120 counties, the state 
EOC would have 11 emergency management eegions, which is 
extremely manageable.54  
 When I’m calling Frankfort [state EOC], I’m just another one of the 
120 emergency management directors. If an area manager calls, 
there is only 11 of them, they are going to listen to them before they 
do anyone else.55 
NIMS identifies a span of control as “the number of resources for which a 
supervisor is responsible, usually expressed as the ratio of supervisors to 
individuals. Under NIMS, an appropriate span of control is between 1:3 and 1:7, 
with optimal being 1:5, or between 1:8 and 1:10 for many large-scale law 
enforcement operations” (USDHS, 2008). 
                                            
54 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 7, 
2010. 
55 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 
2010. 
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While NIMS addresses area command, it does not specify the span of 
control that would be recommended for the area command to oversee. Since 
area command is included in NIMS, one would assume that the same basic 
principles such as the span of control would apply. 
During the ice storm, the state EOC essentially assisted 120 counties 
within the commonwealth. Leaders who participated in the interviews were 
frustrated at the length of time it took for resources to arrive. 
If an area command was established through KYEM area managers, 
resources from within the region could be deployed in a more prompt manner. 
With the necessary information from local EOCs, the KYEM area manager would 
be able to prioritize needs and requests and provide a more holistic picture to the 
state EOC. In turn, the state EOC could focus on managing 11 regions, instead 
of 120 counties.  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGIONALZATION  
1. What Agency Should Implement Regionalization? 
One question posed within this thesis is related to the differences in 
perceptions among leaders regarding the role that leaders play in promoting 
regionalization. Kentucky Emergency Management at the state, regional, and 
local level should be the agency to promote regionalization. Seventy five percent 
of leaders interviewed agreed that Emergency Management must be the catalyst 
or must have a significant role in regionalization for the concept to reach fruition. 
Interview participants viewed emergency management agencies as having an “all 
hazard” approach and as being accustomed to working across agencies. 
Specifically, KYEM area managers were viewed as the ones to implement 
regionalization during an event.  
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There are 11 emergency management regions across the state of 
Kentucky. To me, that is the administrative division and structure to 
use [for regionalization]. Each one of those has an area manager.56 
According to NIMS, area command may be implemented by “an Agency 
Administrator/Executive or other public official with jurisdictional responsibility for 
the incident” (USDHS, 2008). KYEM area managers with the Kentucky Division 
of Emergency Management could fulfill this role. However, regionalization or area 
command is not addressed in the current Kentucky Revised Statutes. KRS 
39A.230, procedures for one multirisk, multiagency, unified incident command or 
management systems, includes the following language: 
(1) The Kentucky Emergency Operations Plan shall include procedures 
for one multirisk, multiagency, unified incident command or 
management system to be used by all state agencies responding to 
the scene of an emergency, declared emergency, disaster, or 
catastrophe, as contemplated by KRS 39A.010, 39A.020, or 
39A030. 
(2) Local emergency operations plans shall include procedures for:  
a. An incident command or management system to be used by 
individual local agencies or departments when responding to the 
scene of day-to-day, routine emergency incidents; and 
b. One unified incident command or management system to be 
used by all local agencies or departments when responding to the 
scene of a multiagency or multijurisdictional emergency, declared 
emergency or disaster. 
                                            
56 Anonymous emergency management official, interviewed by the author on August 30, 
2010. 
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The statute addresses local or county plans but does not address 
regionalization or crossing jurisdictional boundaries. Without regionalization 
addressed through legislation, county political leaders, county agencies, and 
local emergency management directors may not agree to embrace the concept.  
2. Full-Time Local Emergency Management Directors  
This research investigated the challenges for leaders seeking to 
implement formal regionalization. Many local emergency management directors 
in Kentucky are employed part-time by their respective counties. Each of 
Kentucky’s county judge executives are at liberty to determine whether a full-time 
or part-time position is required to successfully fulfill requirements set forth in the 
Kentucky Revised Statutes for emergency managers. Part-time emergency 
managers are likely not to have time to devote to attending meetings, trainings, 
and exercises that occur throughout the year, limiting the amount of networking 
and learning that full-time emergency managers have the opportunity to 
participate in.  
County emergency management directors are seen as the “go to” people 
for knowledge of the resources, programs, and people within their county. 
Without proactively becoming involved in planning efforts and meetings within his 
respective county, the director cannot fulfill his or her job.  
All counties within the commonwealth should have a full-time emergency 
management director to increase the time spent on emergency planning and 
networking within the county and throughout the region. Currently, the Kentucky 
Division of Emergency Management allocates funding to each county to offset 
expenses incurred by local emergency management directors. The Kentucky 
Division of Emergency Management has approached counties that currently 
have part-time directors and offered to match funding to support a full-time 
position; however, many county judge executives have declined the offer. One 
could speculate that the county judge executives declined the offer due to county 
funding or the perception that they do not currently need a full-time emergency 
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management director. The Kentucky Division of Emergency Management must 
make funding full-time emergency management directors a priority for all 
counties throughout the commonwealth. In addition to funding full-time 
emergency management directors, the Kentucky Division of Emergency 
Management should provide education to all county judge executives on the 
importance and necessity of each emergency management director. 
3. Chain of Command for Resource Requests  
When local emergency management directors have resource requests 
that cannot be fulfilled within their counties, a call is made to the state EOC. 
During the ice storm, interview participants reported that the state EOC 
accepted resource requests from political officials not involved in the county 
EOC. 
A clear chain of command from the county to the state EOC must be 
upheld during an emergency. If regionalization is to advance in Kentucky, a 
protocol must be established to address how resources can be requested and 
who can make requests at the local and regional levels. 
4. Area Commands Must Be Adequately Staffed  
The state should have sent people down to the regions if they 
intended for it [the area command center] to function, but the truth 
of the matter is that people were so overwhelmed, no one did 
anything.57 
Incident management teams could be sent to the regions to 
augment the regional manager.58 
The state EOC was bombarded with requests during the ice storm; 
likewise, if regionalization is established through KYEM area managers, that 
individual will be overwhelmed if every county within the region calls. If 
                                            
57 Anonymous Health Department official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 2010. 
58 Anonymous Emergency Management official, interviewed by the author on August 30, 
2010. 
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regionalization is pursued, the capacity must exist to staff local EOCs, as well as 
the area command. KYEM area managers must have trained people who will be 
able to be activated to the area command center during an emergency. 
According to NIMS, area commands are typically staffed with an Area 
Commander, Assistant Area Commander for Planning, and an Assistant Area 
Commander for Logistics, and support positions including a Resources Unit 
Leader, Situation Unit Leader, Public Information Officer, and Liaison Officer 
(USDHS, 2008). 
As of November 2010, the Kentucky Division of Emergency Management 
has plans to establish incident management teams (IMT). The IMTs will be made 
up of a plethora of trained responders trained to serve as command and general 
staff within the incident command system. There will be IMTs throughout the 
state that could respond during a disaster. The IMTs should be cross-trained to 
fulfill roles within an area command and be assigned to one of the 11 emergency 
management regions. 
State-level agencies within the commonwealth have already begun 
development of IMTs, including the Kentucky Department of Agriculture and the 
Kentucky Department for Public Health. The Department of Agriculture has 
participated in multistate training to develop agriculture IMTs. The Department for 
Public Health has leveraged Health and Human Services funding to sponsor all-
hazard incident management trainings to train state partners on IMTs. The 
Department for Public Health has also requested that FEMA conduct an 
EOC/IMT Interface Integrated Emergency Management course. This course is 
designed to provide education and an exercise environment to coordinate the 
interface between leaders in the EOC and field operation command centers, 
similar to what an area command center set-up would entail.  
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5. Education, Plans, and Exercises 
Area command should not materialize only when you have a 
disaster. If done right, it needs a group of people to meet, train, and 
talk about stuff. In the process of that, they are going to be 
networking and have the same mindset and priorities.59 
It was hypothesized that leaders may not be familiar with the concept of 
regionalization, and that may have been a factor as to why regions did not 
regionalize. Local leaders and responders must be educated about the rationale 
and benefits of regionalization. According to KRS 39C.050, to be eligible for state 
funding for local emergency management directors, at least one representative 
must attend an annual emergency management workshop (KRS 39C.050). 
Regionalization could be featured at a Governor’s Emergency Management 
Workshop, the Kentucky Emergency Management Association’s annual 
conference, and other stakeholder annual workshops such as the Kentucky 
Public Health Association’s annual conference. Kentucky leaders should 
understand the distinction between area command and regionalization and 
should strive to promote both concepts.  
Plans at the local, regional, and state level must be designed to address 
regionalization. Organizational charts and the concept of operations for area 
commands may exist within the state; however, the author did not have access to 
the documents. 
Currently, the Kentucky Division of Emergency Management’s 
Catastrophic Earthquake Response Basic Plan states, “The KYEM Area 
Manager will activate a Regional Coordination Center (RCC) to assist counties in 
the development of a coordinated response to the incident. As it becomes 
possible all State Regional / District offices will dispatch a representative to the 
RCC and assist in the general response to the incident” (Kentucky Division of 
Emergency Management, 2009a). Less than one page in the Catastrophic 
                                            
59 Anonymous emergency medical services official, interviewed by the author on August 30, 
2010. 
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Earthquake Plan is devoted to addressing regional coordination centers. Plans 
addressing regionalization must be much more comprehensive and translucent 
for local leaders to understand the concept and intent. 
After education and plans are complete, regionalization exercises should 
be completed. Funding should be secured at the state level for each of the 11 
regions to participate in a full-scale area command exercise. Until plans are 
taken from paper to implementation, problematic areas will not be addressed. 
6. Emergency Management and Networking 
The fact that we had worked with the healthcare community 
through the HPP program made a huge difference. When you look 
back at the planning that went on, there was more benefit from that 
than there was from any staff trainings or anything like that. We 
were familiar with all the other agencies. So then, when we had a 
role of ESF 8 [public health response] thrust upon us, we had all of 
those relationships that we had developed with the hospitals, 
nursing homes, and EMS. All those relationships bore more fruit 
than any other relationships. The relationships we made with local 
EM and regional EM made a huge difference.60  
In the argument, it was hypothesized that regionalization could enhance 
networking and that networking was important for response. More than half the 
leaders interviewed mentioned that networking before the ice storm was crucial 
to the response success. One way of networking is to participate in local and 
regional meetings, trainings, and exercises. 
Emergency Management at the local, regional, and state level is seen as 
a leader in disaster response. Many other agencies may also be viewed as 
responders during an emergency, but within a certain parameter, for example, 
public health is viewed as responding to issues that have an impact on health. 
Emergency Management has the authority to lead during any emergency, 
regardless of the event. 
                                            
60 Anonymous Health Department Official, interviewed by the author on September 22, 2010.  
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Encompassing the all-hazards approach, Emergency Management, at the 
local and regional level especially, must network within its respective areas. It is 
crucial that local emergency management directors are involved in meetings that 
involve response planning, such as the Hospital Preparedness Program. Many 
local emergency management directors and KYEM area managers across the 
state are not consistently involved in HPP meetings due to the fact that they are 
part-time, there is no funding in the budget for travel, or they choose not to 
participate. HPP regions plan how to respond to large-scale public health 
emergencies and allocate yearly grant funds toward increasing healthcare 
capacity. The groups typically consist of a plethora of leaders that Emergency 
Management will be responding with during a disaster.  
By actively participating in meetings such as the regional HPP, emergency 
managers will become more familiar with agency plans, protocols, and resources 
at the local and regional level, answer questions specific to the county 
emergency operation plan, and most importantly, know whom to call for 
resources during an emergency. 
7. Framework for Regionalization  
One approach to regionalization is the concept of a megacommunity. 
Booz Allen Hamilton consulting firm has defined a megacommunity as “a public 
sphere in which organizations from three sectors—business, government, and 
civil society—deliberately join together around compelling issues of mutual 
importance, following a set of practices and principles that make it easier for 
them to achieve results without sacrificing their individual goals” (Gerencser et 
al., 2008). In Megacommunities, How Leaders of Government, Business and 
Non-Profits Can Tackle Today’s Global Challenges Together, chapters 
throughout the book address the definition of a megacommunity, initiation of a 
megacommunity, the structure and sustainability of the megacommunity, and 
recommendations for leaders of megacommunities (Gerencser, et al., 2008). 
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Five critical elements of a megacommunity include: 
 Tri-sector engagement from business, government, and 
nongovernmental organizations; 
 Identified interest that impacts all members; 
 Mutual action for all members; 
 A structure that establishes protocols and principles; 
 The ability of the megacommunity to make progress. (Gerencser et 
al., 2008). 
The Kentucky Division of Emergency Management should consider the 
megacommunity model for approaching regionalization.  
F. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Kentucky leaders and responders have a reputation of willingness to 
assist one another as well as deploying resources to assist other states during 
times of disasters. By implementing regionalization, Kentucky could take the next 
step toward improving responses during a large-scale disaster.  
If regionalization is pursued, future research could be conducted on how 
Kentucky has improved resource allocation, regional decision making, and 
networking throughout the state.  
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